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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROTECTION AND TRADE
DEFLECTION
by
Veysel Avsar
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Richard Chisik, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes the trading effects and the politics of antidumping.
The first essay empirically examines the influence of partisanship on
antidumping. I show that an increase in the leftist orientation of the
government makes labor intensive industries less likely to file an
antidumping petition. I also demonstrate that the increase in the leftist
orientation of the government is associated with an increase in the likelihood
of an affirmative antidumping outcome for the petitions of labor intensive
industries.
The

second

essay

investigates

the

effect

of

past

exporting

relationships of the firms, whose products are targeted by antidumping
duties, on their export flows to alternative markets. My estimations show
that facing an antidumping duty on a product leads to a 18% increase in the
exports of the firm for that product to the alternative countries where the
firms previously exported the same product and a 8% increase to the
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countries where the firms exported another product. On the contrary, I fail to
find a significant effect of antidumping duties on the exports of the particular
product to third countries to which the firm did not export before. Further, I
show that a firm’s probability to start exporting the duty imposed product in
a different destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported
another product to that destination. However, I find no such evidence for the
countries to which the firm did not export before.
The

third

essay

empirically

analyzes

the

effect

of

potential

antidumping claims, resulting from an antidumping investigation in the
domestic market, on the quality of exported products to the target countries.
My findings suggest that retaliation threats increase the quality of firms’
shipments for the named industries’ products to the target countries by 11%.
This effect is also significantly increasing in the share of the exports of the
named industries’ products shipped to the target country in the firms’ total
exports. Further, I show that this effect is 4 % higher for the exporters
serving the developed countries and 3% higher for ones serving the heavy
antidumping users.
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CHAPTER 1
INDUSTRY LEVEL EVIDENCE ON PARTISAN TRADE
POLICY: TARIFF vs. ANTIDUMPING
Introduction
To date, the role of political ideology in the choice of economic policy
instruments has received serious attention by political economists. Much of
the existing studies suggest that in a democratic regime, political parties
which compete for electoral votes try to adopt policies in favor of their
electoral base. Hence, it is the constituents’ interests which determine the
ideological attitude of the governments. Generally, the political party that is
in the left ideological spectrum represents workers, whereas the right-wing
represents capital owners.1
Trade policy is one of the policy instruments, which enables a political
party

to

differentiate itself

from

others

to

compete

for

votes.

The redistributive consequence of the trade policy is the pivotal argument of
the political economists who have emphasized the partisan-based trade
policy.

For

instance, Milner

and

Judkins

(2004),

henceforth

MJ, investigate the relationship between “class cleavage based partisanship”
and “trade policy” of a political party and find that left-wing parties in
advanced industrial countries adopt more protectionist policies compared to
1

See Hibbs (1977), Alesina(1987), Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos (1982), Pinto and Pinto (2008)
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the right-wing parties. Focusing on US trade policy between 1877 and 1934,
Epstein and O.Halloran (1996) showed that Republicans raised the tariffs,
while Democrats cut them. Rogowski (1989, pp. 98) predicts that in countries,
such as United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which
are capital and land

rich, left-wing parties

should

be

protectionist. By

combining the political support function of Hillman (1989) with StoperSamuelson theorem, Dutt and Mitra (2005), henceforth (DM), show that leftwing governments are protectionist in capital abundant countries, whereas
they are pro-trade in labor abundant countries when compared to their rightwing counterparts.

Further,

of partisan preferences

on

the

Krever

(2008)

highlights

the impact

government’s decision to form preferential

trade agreements. His results indicate that independent of its factor
endowments,

a

country is

more

likely

to form preferential

trade

agreements when there is a right-wing government in power.
In this paper, I exploit the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and
protection data to analyze the effect of political ideology on trade policy. My
first focus is the level of tariffs, which is an extension of DM (2005) to the
industry level. Second, I examine whether the political ideology of the
governments affect the usage of antidumping. In this regard, my study
represents the first attempt to integrate antidumping in the study of partisan
trade policy.

2

Antidumping has become the most effective contingent protection tool
in the past 20 years. Until the late 1980s, the use of AD was limited to
developed countries; however, its world-wide use has increased over the past
decade. According to Bown (2008), more than 40 members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) have become active users of AD. The WTO records also
show that there were 4,364 AD cases initiated between 1991 and 2007.
Aggarwal (2007, pp.151, 152) notes three possible perspectives for the
rationale behind the proliferation of AD: the political perspective, the
political economy perspective, and the economic perspective. The first two
argues that AD is a GATT/WTO legal trade remedy used to provide
protection to the domestic firms which is injured by the imports of their
foreign competitors. On the other hand, AD is a policy which aims to prevent
predatory dumping, a situation where unfair pricing drives the domestic
firms out of the market, according to the economic perspective. In this study,
I build on the “political economy perspective” to antidumping and seek
evidence as to whether the political ideology of the government has an effect
on AD usage.
Antidumping has some appealing features that have led to fruitful
approaches for researchers. The main difference between AD and tariffs is
that in order to receive protection in the form of an AD duty, a firm has to file
an investigation and show evidence that the exporting firm’s price is lower
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than the "fair price" it normally charges in its home market. In addition to
this, it has to prove that the domestic industry is "materially injured" by the
different pricing in different markets (WTO 1995, Article 2.1 and 3.4). In
addition, Prusa (2001) argues that AD duties have larger effects on trade
flows of particular goods, compared to MFN (Most favored nation) tariffs,
given the fact that AD duties are 10 to 20 times higher than the MFN level.
His results show that AD duties decrease the value of total imports by 3050%. He also finds that even if the AD investigations do not result
affirmatively, the initiations themselves decrease the imports for the goods
subject to filings. Even though this last finding of Prusa (2001) is an incentive
for firms to file an investigation, the fixed cost of each petition has an
opposite effect on this incentive. On the other hand, Blonigen (2006) suggests
that prior experience of firms in pursuing an AD petition increases the
probability of a successful outcome.
Studies which examine the determinants of AD initiations also focus
on the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on AD filings. For
instance, Feinberg (2005) analyzes the AD petitions of U.S. firms and shows
that decrease in GDP growth rates and appreciation of domestic currency is
associated with higher probability of AD initiations. Knetter and Prusa
(2003) also arrived at the same conclusion. In addition, Francois and Neils
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(2006) finds that Mexican firms are more likely to file an AD petition in
periods of current account deficit.
Another focus in the AD literature is the strategic consideration of the
AD activity. Prusa and Skeath (2002) provide evidence that countries are
more likely to name the exporters of the countries which previously filed AD
cases against them. Using a nested logit framework where the first stage
determines the decision to file an AD investigation and the second stage
determines the government's decision to impose an AD duty, Blonigen and
Bown (2003) show that potential retaliation threats affect both the initiations
and outcomes of antidumping in the US. Further support comes from
Feinberg and Reynolds (2006), who find strong evidence that retaliation is a
significant factor in explaining the proliferation of worldwide AD filings.
Another strand of the literature seeks to explore the role of tariff
liberalization in the use of AD. The main point of these studies is the
potential substitution between tariff and AD, which is a result of the shift
towards international competition via trade liberalization and the domestic
pressures associated with this shift. Aggarwal (2007, pp. 179) shows that a
decline in mean tariff rates leads to an increase in the total number of AD
initiations in a country. In addition, Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) found that
tariff cuts agreed in the Uruguay Round increased the likelihood of observing
an AD petition. Using applied tariffs, as opposed to the bound tariffs used in
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Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), Moore and Zanardi (2008) support the
substitution hypothesis of tariff and AD for the heavy users of AD. Moreover,
modifying the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
Bown and Tovar (2008) find that reduction in tariffs, stemming from India’s
trade policy reforms in 1990s, is associated with an increase in its AD
activity, the heaviest AD-user country in recent years.
In this paper, I examine the role of political ideology and AD activity
by following the substitution argument of tariff and AD. My theory of
protection is motivated by the earlier work of DM (2005). Simply put, StolperSamuelson theorem predicts that trade will increase the demand for the
abundant factor in production and decrease for the scarce one. Therefore, in a
capital intensive industry, it is the owners of labor who suffer, while capital
owners gain from a shift towards protection. On the contrary, increased trade
will benefit capital and hurt labor in labor intensive industries. DM (2005)
argues that since importable good is the labor intensive one in a capital-rich
country, an increase in the leftist orientation of the government increases the
trade barriers in capital abundant countries, and an opposite scenario holds
for the labor abundant countries. This hypothesis is strongly supported in
DM (2005) with different types of protection tools such as tariffs, import
duties and quotas.

6

The main contribution of my study is the integration of AD use to
examine the relationship between political ideology and protection. Besides,
we also extend DM’s work with an industry level estimation of tariffs using
the recently available data of the protection of industries. In line with DM
(2005), our results indicate that predictions of the partisan trade theory hold
at the industry level as well. In addition, we empirically investigate how the
government’s political ideology affects the decision to file an AD petition. This
also allows us to test the substitution of tariff and AD initiations for the
domestic industries. Moreover, on the basis of the redistributive effect of
trade policy, we also check whether the imposition of AD duties shows the
same pattern as tariffs in terms of partisan preferences of the governments..
Furthermore, we conduct a robustness check for the measure of the ideology
variable, as suggested by DM (2005). Finally, I also test the validity of our
results addressing the sample selection bias in the set of AD initiations. In
sum, my results suggest that political ideology of the governments affect the
level of tariffs, AD filings of the industries as well as the AD duty imposition
decision of the governments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I set up a
theoretical model which provides testable implications for the effect of an
increase in the leftist bias of the government on the tariff and AD use of
industries. Section 3 describes the econometric approach and various
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specifications undertaken in our analysis. In Section 4, we briefly discuss the
construction of data used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the
estimation results, and section 6 provides the concluding remarks.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we modify the model of DM (2002) to extend it to
industry level, in order to show the effect of the government’s ideology on
protection. To do so let us consider an economy with N industries, each of
which has two kinds of factor owners: workers and capitalists.2 Each good
produced has a specific tariff of
) where

which generates a tariff revenue of

)

) denotes the total imports. We assume that the share of

industry h in total tariff revenue is proportional to its production share in the
economy and each factor owner receives tariff revenue proportional to their
factor income share in an industry. Turning to the demand side, we suppose
that individual preferences are identical and homothetic. An individual i’s
indirect utility function can, as a result, be written as

)

) where

is her income. Total incomes of all capitalists and of all workers in industry
h are given respectively by
)

)
)

2

)

+
+

(1.1)

)
)

1

)

We assume that workers only own labor and capitalists only own capital.
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(1.2)

where

denotes the production share of industry h and
) and

share of capitalists in industry h.

denotes the income

) denote the wage rate and the

rental rate respectively.
Giving labor welfare the weight of α and capitalist welfare the weight
of 1- α, the government chooses the level of tariff for industry h to maximize
its objective function which is given by
∑∈

)

)∑ ∈

+ 1

(1.3)

The above objective function can also be written as
)
where

)

(1.4)

)

is the weighted aggregate income given by
1+ )

where

)

.

+ 1

)

is the capital labor ratio of sector i and

(1.5)

)

is the ratio of total tariff

revenue to total income of the economy.
Letting Iu(t) denote the weighted income for an industry of unit size,
the government maximizes
Φ
1

) + ψ t)
)

)

where

.

)

) which is also same as maximizing
)

) and ψ t)

ln

)

)+

+ ln 1 + ). We assume that this objective function satisfies the

second order condition for a unique solution. The first order condition for
government’s maximization problem is
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)+
Let

∗

(1.6)

0

be the equilibrium protection here which maximizes the government’s

objective function. The key question is that how this protection level changes
with the ideology of the government. The answer comes from differentiating
the first order condition with respect to α, the weight government attaches on
labor welfare. An increase in α can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist
orientation of the government. By differentiating the first order condition we
obtain
∗

)
)

)
)

)

)

)
)

(1.7)

/

Given the fact that protection is beneficial for the owners of the factor which
is used intensively in the production of the importable, we have
′ )

0 for a capital intensive industry, whereas

)

0 and

)

0 and
)

0 for

a labor intensive industry. Due to the concavity assumption imposed, the
denominator of the above derivative is always negative. Consequently, we
have ∂t*/ ∂α > 0 for labor intensive industries, while ∂t*/ ∂α < 0 for capital
intensive industries.
Since tariff is the major protection tool, the first proposition is that an
increase in the leftist bias of the government leads to an increase in the
tariffs for labor intensive industries. In addition, we argue that antidumping
is a substitute policy instrument for the industries which do not receive

10

adequate protection via tariffs and the probability of observing an
antidumping initiation decreases for the labor intensive industries with an
increase in the government’s leftist bias.
Econometric Methodology and Data
Our empirical analysis includes three sections in which we analyze the
effect of political ideology on the tariff levels of the industries, the probability
of industry level AD investigations, and the probability of an affirmative AD
decision by government AD agencies, respectively.
Estimation of Industry Level Tariffs
Here we take a further step following DM (2005) and MJ (2004) and
analyze the link between the governments’ political partisanship and tariffs
at the industry level. The theory outlined above predicts that there is a
positive relationship between the left-wing ideology of the government and
tariff for the industries with low ( / ) given the fact that left-wing
governments tend to redistribute income via policies to benefit labor. To test
this prediction we estimate the following linear model:
+

∗ ⁄

+

+

⁄

+

+
(1.8)

where

denotes the weighted applied tariff level of three-digit ISIC

industry h in country i,

⁄ )

is the capital-labor ratio of the industry,
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denotes the degree of the government’s leftist bias and

is a

vector of control variables.3 Differentiating equation (8) with respect to
we have

+

∗

The testable implication here is that

⁄ )
0 and

(1.9)

0 as pointed out

in the theoretical model.
We also consider several control variables in our specifications. The
first one is the share of industry output in total GDP which is related to the
campaign contributions provided to the government elections in Grossman
and Helpman (1994) model. We believe that industries with higher output
share have higher ability to be politically organized and to lobby for
protection. In addition, the competition from imports and the change in the
total production of the industry would affect the protection level of the
industry. To control for this effect, we use the average import and output
growth of the industry in the last three years. We also control for the
macroeconomic variables such as the percentage change in exchange rate,
growth rate of GDP and the current account. All of these macroeconomic
variables might be associated with the pressure against free trade. Following
DM (2005), we also include the democracy level given the fact that politicians
We use the natural logs of capital-labor ratios as in Dutt and Mitra (2005). Besides, this
variable is lagged one period in all specifications of our empirical analysis to avoid the
potential endogeneity between capital-labor ratio and protection.

3
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in democratic regime are more prone to pursue policies in favor of their
electoral base. Moreover, we control for the WTO membership and the years
of WTO membership of the country to capture the effect of WTO
commitments and their trend on tariffs. Finally, we include country and
three digit ISIC industry fixed effects to control for the unobservable country
and industry specific variations.
Estimation of Antidumping Initiations
To empirically test the effect of partisanship on AD activity, linear
probability model is used to estimate a country’s three digit ISIC industry’s
decision of filing an AD petition.4 To do so, we aggregate the data on AD
investigations from case-level to industry-level by matching the data on sixdigit Harmonized System product level AD information to data on production
of three-digit ISIC industries. Our baseline model is:
1)

φ

+

+

∗

/ )

+

/ )

+

4 ℎ+ )ℎ
(1.10)
where

takes on a value of 1 if the industry filed at least one AD

investigation in the given year and zero otherwise.5 Similar to the tariff
equation, we have the ideology, capital-labor ratio and their interaction in the
4 Another strategy would be to use the number of AD filings as the dependent variable.
However, it is impossible to find a predictor to separate the sampling and structural zeros in
the dependent variable. See, Aggarwal (2007) for the same argument.
5 Bown (2008) uses the same dependent variable and applies the same aggregation strategy
combining the same data sources used in this paper.
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AD model. However, the expected signs of the coefficients for ideology
variable and the interaction term are reversed because of the substitution
argument of antidumping and tariffs. We hypothesize that an increase in the
leftist orientation of the government makes labor intensive industries, which
already received higher protection via tariffs, less likely to pursue an
antidumping investigation.
We control for various other factors following the AD literature. For
instance, WTO rules require domestic firms to provide evidence that dumping
takes place on the one hand and the industry is materially injured on the
other (WTO, 1995; Article 2.1 and 3.4). To control for these considerations, we
include the average output and import growth of the industry in the last
three years. The likelihood of filing an AD petition should increase with the
fall in production and with more competition from imports. We also believe
that industries with higher output have more ability to file an AD petition
because of the fact that it is easier for them to cover the fixed costs associated
with filing an AD initiation and follow the necessary process of an AD
investigation. Consequently, we control for the share of industry output in a
country’s total GDP to capture the lobbying and the financial power of that
particular industry. Following Francois and Niels (2006) and Knetter and
Prusa (2003), we also control for macroeconomic indicators such as GDP
growth, percentage change in the value of exchange rate and the current
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account balance. We are more likely to find an AD petition in periods of
exchange rate appreciation, current account deficits and economic recession.
In addition, as noted in Bown (2008), 1995 inception of WTO resulted in a
common set of rules which are binding for all WTO members. Therefore, we
also control for the WTO membership and the years of WTO membership to
see the effect of WTO rules and enforcements and their trend on industries’
AD activity. Moreover, although the primary interest of this paper is to
investigate the effect of political ideology on tariff and AD, including applied
tariff as a control variable in the model of AD initiations also leads us to
contribute to the earlier works of Moore and Zanardi (2008), Feinberg and
Reynolds (2007) and Bown and Tovar (2008) which investigate the role of
tariff liberalization in the face of the spread of antidumping usage.6 Finally,
similar to the tariff equation, we also control for the democracy level in the
countries.
Estimation of Antidumping Outcomes
We now turn our focus to the AD duty imposition decisions of AD
authorities. National governments, when undertaking the AD process, seek
considerable economic evidence on two issues: (1) whether there is
international price discrimination, where the price of an exported good is less
than its “fair value” in the market of the exporting country and (2) whether

6

Following Zanardi (2008), we lag the applied tariff one period.

15

this unfair pricing causes injury to the domestic market. Having reviewed the
filings, AD authorities impose extra duties on the particular good in order to
bring the value of the good closer to its fair value.
In order to quantify the effect of government’s ideology on the
affirmative AD outcome, we carry out a case-level estimation and pool the
data of all AD investigations In addition, owing to the raw data of product
level information on AD investigations, the case-level analysis enables us to
include the six-digit Harmonized System tariff when providing an answer to
the question whether tariff and antidumping duties are substitute or
complement policy instruments from the perspective of the governments. The
following linear probability model is estimated:
1)
+

η

+

+

∗

/ )

+

/ )

+
(1.11)

)

where the binary dependent variable

is 1 if government authorities

decide affirmatively to a specific AD case from industry h and zero for all
other outcomes such as negative, withdrawn and terminated. It should be
noted that the ideology variable in (11) denotes the ideology of the
government at the time of the final injury decision. Our hypothesis is that
left-wing governments, which tend to increase the returns to labor, are more
likely to decide affirmatively for AD cases of the industries that are labor
intensive. Therefore, the predicted signs of the ideology variable and the
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interaction term are positive and negative respectively, as are in the tariff
equation.
A serious problem in estimation AD outcomes is that the expected
value of the dependent variable, the outcome of the AD petition, affects the
sample size. This creates a potential sample selection bias in the set of AD
initiations when we estimate the AD outcomes.7 As shown in Blonigen (2006),
when deciding to file a petition, firms evaluate the decision rule where
expected gains from filing a petition is greater than the fixed cost of filing.
Therefore, firms pursue an AD petition only if
∗

where

.

(1.12)

0

denotes the expected probability of an affirmative AD decision,

denotes the expected gain from a successful outcome and

denotes the fixed

cost associated with filing a petition. Therefore, industries with smaller
output share are less likely to follow an AD investigation because of the fixed
cost involved. In order to remedy this potential sample selection bias, we also
estimate AD outcomes using the Heckman (1979) selection model. The
outcome equation for the governments’ decision to impose duty becomes
+

(1.13)

7 Hansen (1990) and Bown (2006) also address the sample selection bias in the set of AD
investigations.
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However,

is not observed for the industries for which the expected

gain of the successful outcome does not exceed the fixed cost of filing
associated with a petition. Our assumption is that
+

is only observed if
(1.14)

0

In the Heckman selection model

and

are the vectors of

explanatory variables to be estimated. Further, we assume that

~

0 1
,
0

1

(1.15)

Separate estimation of AD outcomes will yield biased estimates for the
parameters, if

0. The Heckman model offers an estimation strategy which

corrects the sample selection bias by treating the industries’ decision to file
an AD petition as the first stage selection equation and the governments’ AD
duty imposition decision as the second stage outcome equation.
In addition to all control variables in the previous AD analysis, the
selection equation of the Heckman model has to contain at least one variable,
which is not included in the outcome equation, to identify the selection
equation. For this purpose, we use the number of establishments (NEST) in
each industry, a proxy for firm concentration in the first stage selection
equation. Studies such as Rodrik (1995) and Reynolds (2006) argue that it is
harder for industries with more firms, or less concentration, to overcome the
free rider problem to file a petition. On the other hand, an increase in the
18

number of firms might be associated with an increase in the probability of
observing AD investigations for the industries which is highly concentrated
due to the competitive effect of such an increase on the price levels. This calls
for modeling a possible non-linearity between the number of establishments
and AD filings, which we do by adding a quadratic term of this variable in the
first stage selection equation.
Data
We collected the data of output, import, gross fixed capital formation,
number of workers, number of establishments and the tariff data of 28 threedigit ISIC industries from World Bank Trade, Production and Protection
(TPP) database (Nicita and Olerreaga, 2006). The tariff variable we employ is
the import weighted average applied tariffs for the 28 three-digit ISIC
industries. Following the convention, the capital stocks ( ) of industries are
calculated from investment series by the perpetual inventory equation:
+ 1
where

)

(1.16)

is the gross fixed capital formation and

The initial capital stock (

) is computed as

is the depreciation rate.8
/

+ ), where

average geometric growth rate for the first ten years of available data. 9

8

The depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.06.

9

See Caselli (2004).
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is the

The data on product-level AD investigations and outcomes are
obtained from Global Antidumping Database Version 5.0 (Bown, 2009) which
provides detailed product-level information on AD filings and outcomes. This
database provides the date of the initiation and final decision of AD case, the
target country, the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes
of the products subject to filings. For industry level estimation, we matched
the data on AD investigations at the six-digit Harmonized System product
level to data on production in three-digit ISIC industries. For the case-level
analysis, we pooled the data on all AD investigations and assigned each
observation its three-digit ISIC code using the concordances in the TPP
database.
For the political ideology variable, we utilize the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2008), which is updated annually and includes data
for the period 1975 through 2006. This database provides qualitative
information on the political position of the executive power for each country,
in the form of leftist, centrist and rightist ideologies. Our continuous ideology
variable, whose increase can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist
orientation, takes on a value of 1, 2 and 3 for the right-wing, center-wing and
left-wing governments respectively.10 For the democracy index, we use

10 While we do not report in the paper, we also tried assigning a dummy variable for each
ideology category and running the regressions with that measure in order to test for the
robustness of the results. Our findings are insensitive to different treatment of the ideology
measure.

20

Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Freedom House’s publication which
was published in 1972 and reports the data on civil liberties and political
rights for 193 countries. The democracy (political rights) index is such that
more democratic countries are assigned a lower score than less democratic
countries on a scale of 1 to 7. We reversed the scores by subtracting each
score from 8 so that more democratic countries take higher scores.
The data on WTO membership come from WTO website and the data
on tariff of six-digit Harmonized System products are obtained from
UNCTAD’s TRAINS database which is accessed through The World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software developed by the World Bank.
Finally, we use the database of United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Economic Research Service for the data of exchange rate and World
Development Indicators, 2005 for the data of GDP growth and the current
account.
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provide the descriptive statistics and the data
sources for the industry level and case-level analysis, respectively. We
construct a balanced panel for the tariff and the AD estimations, which
covers the time period between 1986 and 2001. However, the availability of
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the tariff, investment and labor data in TPP determines the sample of our
analysis.11
Results
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results of equation (8). Specification
(1) reports the results without any controls and fixed effects. Specification (2)
includes political, macroeconomic and other industry controls. Specifications
(3) documents the estimates when fixed effects are also included for the
unobservable country or/and industry variations. Focusing first on the
variables of interest in Table 1.3, we see that the coefficient of the ideology
variable and the coefficient of the interaction term are positive and negative
respectively. Both of them are also statistically

significant

in all

specifications. As shown, there is a positive relationship between the level of
tariffs and the government’s leftist orientation for low levels of capital-labor
ratio. As the capital-labor ratio increases, the negative interaction term
dominates the positive ideology coefficient.
In terms of control variables, consistent with the political influence
hypothesis, higher output share of the industry is associated with lower
tariffs. However, output and import growth of the industry are insignificant
The reason why we do not include the European Union (EU) countries is that AD decisions
in the European Union are evaluated by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission
which makes it ambiguous to analyze which country’s ideology matters. In addition, as
provided by Global AD database (Bown, 2009), firms from different countries jointly file in
most of the AD cases of the EU. Furthermore, Indonesia is excluded from our sample because
the ideologies of the political parties of Indonesia are unspecified in DPI database.

11
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when fixed effects are included. The growth rate of GDP has a significant
positive effect on the industry tariff, which implies that it is easier for
governments to increase the tariffs in a period of economic growth, reason
being that the increase in prices hurts consumers less than it does in a period
of recession. However, the other two macroeconomic factors, current account
and exchange rate, has no significant effect on tariffs. In addition, the effect
of democracy on trade liberalization is positive in our preferred specification
in which we have country and industry fixed effects. This finding also
supports the earlier work of Milner and Kubota (2005) which shows that
reduced trade barriers are associated with a movement toward democracy.12.
Finally, the WTO membership reduced the tariffs but the coefficient estimate
of the “years of WTO membership” suggests that the liberalization effect of
the WTO decreases as each year passes.
Turning to the industries’ decision to file an AD investigation, we
report the estimates of the linear probability model in equation (10) in Table
1.4. Specifications (1) shows the results without any controls but the control
variables and fixed effects are included in all other specifications. As opposed
to results in Table 1.3, the negative coefficient of the ideology variable and
the positive coefficient of the interaction term in all specifications support our
prediction that the likelihood of an industry’s decision to pursue an AD
investigation decreases for labor intensive industries when the government’s
12

Milner and Kubota (2005) use a different proxy for democracy.
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leftist orientation increases. The rationale behind this finding is that an
increase in the leftist orientation of the government makes labor intensive
industries, which receive higher protection via tariffs, less likely to file an AD
petition. The reversed signs of the ideology and its interaction in Tables 1.3
and 1.4 also go along with the substitution hypothesis between trade
liberalization and AD use. Once again, the significance of the ideology
variable and the interaction term is insensitive to inclusion of control
variables and fixed effects.
In accordance with the lobbying and financial power argument,
industries with higher output share are more likely to file an AD
investigation. Besides, with respect to the WTO requirements, an increase in
industry output is associated with a decrease in the probability of observing
an AD initiation for an industry. Both the output share and the output
growth are significant in all specifications. In addition, consistent with the
previous studies in AD literature, appreciation of the local currency, the
periods of economic recession and current account deficit are associated with
an increase in the likelihood of AD use. However, we do not find any
significant effect of import growth of the industry on AD filings when
controlling for country and industry fixed effects. Moreover, increase in the
democratization of the country makes domestic firms more likely to pursue
an AD investigation. This can be attributed to the higher expected probability
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of wining an AD case because of better institutions in a democratic regime.
This result might also implicate that industries in democratic countries have
easier access to the government agencies which reduces their filing costs
associated with an AD petition. The liberalization efforts of democracies
might also rush industries toward filing AD cases. The positive sign of the
coefficient on the WTO membership shows the triggering effect of common set
of AD rules on the industries’ AD initiations after the 1995 inception of WTO.
On the other hand, the estimate of years of WTO membership shows that the
effect of WTO on industries’ AD filings was higher in the first years of its
inception and this effect is decreasing over time.
We now turn to the results of government’s decision to impose AD
duty. In Table 1.5, we report the estimates when the data of product level AD
information is pooled and each observation is matched with its three-digit
ISIC code. The availability of the six-digit HS tariff data determines the
sample size here. In line with the earlier discussion, the positive estimate of
the ideology variable and the negative estimate of interaction term
demonstrate that an increase in the leftist bias of the government is
associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative outcome for the
industries

operating

at

low

capital-labor

ratio.

The

estimations

of

governments’ decision to impose AD duty result in the same pattern of signs
for the variables of interest both in tariff and AD outcome equations. In terms
of control variables, we find that petitions from larger industries are
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associated with a higher probability of a successful outcome. Consistent with
the WTO’s requirements, industries facing more competition from imports
are more likely to grant AD protection, as well as the industries experiencing
a depression in production. Finally, we do not find a significant effect of the
macroeconomic determinants on the probability of observing a successful AD
case.
Tables 1.6 documents the results of the Heckman selection model
where the first stage is the industries’ decision to file an AD petition and the
second stage is the governments’ AD duty imposition outcome whether it is
affirmative. Once again, the primary variables of interest are ideology
measure and its interactions. Despite the small variation in the dependent
variable in the second stage, the estimates in column (2) of Table 1.6 support
the results we obtained in the separate estimations of AD outcomes.
Moreover, the altered sign of the ideology variable and its interaction in the
first and second stage is in line with the previous findings of AD
investigations. The number of establishments which is used to identify the
selection model is also significant in both tables. The coefficients on the
variables NEST and NEST2 imply that an increase in the number of firms in
the industry is associated with an increase in the probability of observing an
AD investigation for smaller industries. However the negative coefficient of
the quadratic term, NEST2, indicates that very large industries are less likely
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to file an AD petition.13 This inverted-U shaped relationship between the firm
concentration and AD filings implies that the competition effect which is a
consequence of an increase in the number of firms creates an incentive for the
firms to file an AD petition; however, as the number of firms keeps
increasing, the free rider problem dominates such incentives. In addition,
firms might be reluctant to file a petition in that case given the fact that per
firm benefit of a successful outcome will be reduced for very large
industries.14 In addition to all these points, the same signs for the coefficients
of the ideology variable and its interactions both in tariff and AD outcome
models imply that tariff and antidumping duties are complements in terms of
governments’ trade policy. Therefore, the redistribution argument from
capital to labor due to the pro-labor policies of left-wing government is
supported both in the models of tariff and AD duty imposition.
Conclusion
To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine the effect
of political ideology of the governments on AD protection. Following the
political economy literature which addresses the effect of partisan
preferences of governments on trade policy, we first show evidence that the
predictions of the ideology based model of trade protection is also supported
13

We also tried excluding the quadratic term in the selection equation. However, it resulted
in insignificant estimate of the number of establishments.

14

See Reynolds (2006).
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at the industry level. Consistent with the redistributive mechanism of
protection, we find that an increase in the leftist extent of the government
increases the returns to labor which in turns increases the tariff of the labor
intensive industries. Besides, matching the data on three-digit ISIC
industries’ production and protection with the detailed product level
information on AD filings, we demonstrate that in the periods of left wing
governments, an increase in the labor intensity of the industry is associated
with a decrease in the likelihood of observing an AD initiation from that
industry, which already grants higher protection in the form of tariffs. The
substitutability of tariff and AD usage is supported not only with this result
but also with the robust negative effect of applied tariffs on the probability of
AD filings. In addition, our results suggest the effect of political ideology on
the governments’ decision to impose AD duty. The empirical results of both
separate estimation and two-stage Heckman model, which corrects the
potential sample selection bias, confirm that the probability of a successful
AD investigation increases in labor intensity of that industry when there is a
left-wing government in power. Our last finding also speaks to the
complementarity of tariff and AD duties from the governments’ view. Our
results are robust to controlling for country and industry fixed effects and
also insensitive to controlling for several factors which is pointed out in the
existing literature.
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Table. 1.1 Summary Statistics (Industry level)

Variable
AD Initiation
AD affirmative˜
Ideology
K/L (log)
Output share
Output growth§
Import growth§
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current account*
Number of establishments
WTO membership
Years of WTO membership
Democracy
Tariff (3 digit)

Mean
0.096
0.724
1.936
10.161
0.936
0.091
0.508
4.090
0.950
24.656
1795
0.384
1.392
5.576
12.499

Max
1
1
3
16.629
13.228
4.820
180.498
12.822
69.458
40.371
95664
1
7
7
337.16

Min
0
0
1
4.702
0.001
0.613
0.986
-11.7
0.151
-413.442
1
0
0
2
0

variable scaled down by 106

-

*

-

§ Average

percentage change, three years before t.

- ˜ indicates the summary statistics when AD initiation=1
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Standard deviation
0.295
0.447
0.927
1.257
1.331
0.186
5.562
3.941
6.460
65.385
4.269
0.486
2.109
1.292
19.288

N
3500
338
3500
3355
3318
3402
3472
3500
3472
3500
2752
3500
3500
3500
1544

Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics (Case level)

Variable
AD affirmative
Ideology
K/L (log)
Output share
Output growth§
Import growth§
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current account*
WTO membership
Years of WTO membership
Democracy
Tariff (6 digit)

Mean
0.596
1.711
11.102
1.598
0.047
0.080
3.307
0.092
-60.680
0.427
1.878
6.190
12.585

Max
1
3
13.157
12.357
1.908
4.033
9.486
1.638
40.371
1
7
7
65

Min
0
1
8.276
0.022
-0.561
-0.507
-6.854
- 0.157
-413.442
0
0
3
0

variable scaled down by 10

-

*

-

§ Average

percentage change, three years before t.
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Standard deviation
0.490
0.946
0.932
1.590
0.179
0.270
2.989
6.460
102.243
0.494
2.506
1.240
11.654

N
1328
1328
1249
1246
1242
1324
1328
1328
1328
1328
1328
1328
998

TABLE 1.3. Regression Estimates of Three-Digit ISIC Tariff
(1)
Ideologyit
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht
(K/L)iht

(2)

35.487
(3.67)***
-3.111
(3.53)***
0.478
(0.43)

Political
determinants
Output share
Import growth
Output growth
WTO membership
Years of WTO
membership
Democracy
Macroeconomic
factors
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current Account
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
Tables: 1.3 – 1.6:
respectively

No
No
1426
***, **, *

(3)

33.614
(3.42)***
-2.737
(3.06)***
0.702
(0.62)

15.737
(2.47)**
-1.182
(2.03)**
-1.529
(0.97)

-0.933
(2.66)***
0.076
(3.98)***
-0.051
(0.03)
-22.140
(5.01)***
1.597

-0.600
(2.37)**
0.014
(0.73)
-0.058
(0.76)
-8.237
(4.09)***
0.349

(4.81)***
-0.129
(0.26)

(2.00)**
-2.507
(3.45)***

0.916
(5.98)***
-2.470
(1.49)
0.033
(1.10)

0.570
(6.38)***
0.500
(0.52)
0.007
(1.15)

No
No
1329

Yes
Yes
1329

show the level of significance in 99%, 95% and 90%
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Table 1.4. Linear Probability Model – AD Filings

Binary dependent variable =1 if the industry filed an AD petition

(1)
Ideologyit
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht
(K/L)iht

(2)

-0.077
(2.18)**
0.009
(2.37)**
-0.003
(0.32)

(3)

(4)

-0.103
(2.78)***
0.011
(2.99)***
-0.026
(3.06)***

-0.142
(3.50)***
0.014
(3.47)***
-0.035
(3.94)***

-0.142
(2.07)**
0.016
(2.40)**
-0.039
(2.92)***

0.031
(5.81)***
0.001
(4.97)***
-0.035
(1.70)*
0.222
(3.83)***
-0.027
(5.11)***
0.015
(3.24)***

0.026
(3.81)***
0.001
(0.32)
-0.048
(2.29)**
0.186
(3.24)***
-0.023
(4.50)***
0.014
(2.03)**

0.037
(3.87)***
0.001
(0.21)
-0.035
(1.77)*
0.019
(0.18)
-0.003
(0.29)
0.010
(0.76)

-0.008
(5.14)***
-0.030
(2.53)**
-0.000
(1.72)*

-0.004
(2.20)**
-0.031
(2.18)**
-0.001
(2.81)***

-0.004
(1.06)
0.001
(0.02)
0.001
(3.09)***

Yes
Yes
2954

-0.001
(1.66)*
Yes
Yes
1425

Political determinants
Output share
Import growth
Output growth
WTO membership
Years of WTO membership
Democracy
Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current Account
Tariff (3 digit)
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations

No
No
3022

No
No
2954
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TABLE 1.5. Linear Probability Model – AD Decisions
Binary dependent variable =1 if the government imposed
AD duty
(1)
(2)
(3)
Ideologyit
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht
(K/L)iht

0.385
(1.93)*
-0.037
(2.07)**
0.041
(0.98)

Political
determinants
Output share
Import growth
Output growth
WTO membership
Years of WTO
membership
Democracy
Macroeconomic
factors
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current Account

Tariff (6 digit)
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations

No
No
1195
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1.025
(3.71)***
-0.086
(3.57)***
0.118
(2.08)**

0.735
(2.20)**
-0.062
(2.10)**
0.001
(0.01)

0.024
(1.88)*
0.094
(1.38)
-0.752
(4.80)***
-0.108
(1.31)
0.066

0.025
(1.72)*
0.141
(1.87)*
-0.587
(3.29)***
-0.082
(0.95)
0.102

(2.03)**
0.026
(0.84)

(2.57)**
0.046
(0.50)

0.005
(0.43)
0.027
(0.14)
0.000
(0.43)

-0.006
(0.55)
-0.114
(0.58)
0.000
(0.52)

0.006
(1.91)*
No
No
898

0.010
(2.52)**
Yes
Yes
898

TABLE 1.6. Heckman Selection Model of Antidumping Investigations and
Outcomes

Ideology
Ideology * K/L
K/L
Output share
Import growth
Output growth
WTO membership
Years of WTO membership
Democracy
GDP growth
Exchange rate
Current account
Tariff (3 digit)
NEST
NEST2
Country fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations

Stage 1
Selection Equation
Binary dependent
variable=1
if industry files an
AD petition
-0.931
(1.67)*
0.108
(2.14)**
-0.292
(2.39)**
0.174
(4.13)***
0.097
(1.28)
-0.450
(1.03)
-1.058
(0.56)
0.063
(0.32)
0.044
(0.34)
-0.098
(2.40)**
-0.333
(0.46)
-0.000
(1.45)
-0.033
(5.28)***
0.064
(2.27)***
-0.006
(2.42)**
Yes
Yes
1030
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Stage 2
Regression Equation
Binary dependent variable=1
if government imposes AD
measure
1.231
(1.67)*
-0.141
(2.07)**
0.202
(1.68)*
0.023
(0.35)
0.718
(3.39)***
-0.907
(2.22)**
2.200
(1.89)*
-0.164
(1.44)
-0.154
(1.10)
-0.074
(2.16)**
-1.509
(2.77)***
0.000
(1.20)
0.013
(1.00)

Yes
Yes
159

CHAPTER 2
THE ANATOMY OF TRADE DEFLECTION
Introduction
Antidumping (AD) has become a favorite remedy for the firms which
seek protection. These preferences have increased especially after the
substantial tariff liberalization countries have undergone after the World
Trade Organization (WTO)’s rules and enforcements. Most tariffs are
governed by trade agreements; however countries can receive protection by
the use of alternative safeguards. Among these alternative protection
instruments, AD has become the most frequently used and the most
influential one.15 Today, more than 40 members of the WTO have
implemented AD law and they filed more than 4,000 cases in the last 20
years.
Ideally, AD aims to prevent predatory dumping, a situation where
international price discrimination drives the domestic firms out of the
market. However, because of the imperfect observability of fair and unfair
pricing, it is hard to identify whether AD duties are motivated by dumping or

15 Antidumping duties, which are defined in GATT Article VI, are easier to use compared to
other safeguards such as emergency protection of a threatened industry (GATT Article XIX),
exceptions for health or safety concerns (GATT Article XX) and restrictions for national
security (GATT Article XXI).
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by the domestic pressures towards protection. Much of the evidence suggests
that AD protection is abused to protect inefficient import competing firms.16
Similar to other discriminatory adjustments in trade policy, AD duties
not only affect the trade flows of the named and the duty imposer country but
also affect the trade flows of the third countries.17 This effect can occur in the
form of trade diversion, a change in the source of origin for a country's
imports caused by a change in importer’s trade policy, or in the form of trade
deflection, a change in the destination of exports due to an increase in trade
restriction imposed in a particular export market. One of the more wellknown pieces of evidence on trade diversion is from Prusa (2001) who shows
that US imposition of an AD duty increases the imports from the countries
which are not named in the investigation. Ganguli (2008) and Konings et al.
(2001) also arrive at the same conclusion analyzing the AD investigations of
India and European Union respectively. The idea of trade deflection in the
AD literature, on the other hand, was first introduced by Bown and Crowley
(henceforth BC) (2007). In their product-level analysis, they find that US
imposition of import restrictions in the form of an AD duty resulted in
Japanese exports surging to non-US countries. Their findings suggest that

16

See Konings and Vandenbusche (2008) and Aggarwal (2007).

17 A ‘discriminatory’ trade policy is the one in which a country imposes different trade
restrictions to imports from different exporting countries. Two examples in this category are
the preferential trade agreements and antidumping duties. On the contrary, a
‘nondiscriminatory’ trade policy is the one that is applied equally to all importers.
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exporters which suffer discriminatory trade restrictions in a country strive to
find alternative markets to sell their products.
This study employs a unique three dimensional Brazilian firm-level
data of exports between 1994 and 2000 to investigate the effect of AD duties,
which targets Brazilian exporters, on the trade flows of the targeted firms to
alternative markets in order to pave the way for a more detailed exploration
of trade deflection which has become an important issue in the WTO and
other Custom Unions’ framework. We believe that analyzing the firm-level
responses of AD duties on trade deflection will give us a better understanding
of which destinations are potential export markets to deflect trade for the
firms whose products are targeted by AD measures. Special attention is given
to the ongoing debate in the international trade literature about the role of
sunk start-up costs in the export market and the previous trading
relationship of the firms. We investigate whether this past trading
relationships to different countries affect trade deflection. Our analysis not
only focuses on the intensive margin, increase in the volume of deflected
trade arising from existing exporter-product combinations, but also on the
extensive margin, increase in the new exporter-product combinations in
alternative markets.
One of the outcomes associated with trade deflection is that a third
country, which experiences a substantial import growth, might face pressure
37

to react with a trade remedy of its own. For instance, as noted in BC (2007),
the imposition of safeguard protection on steel products by European Union
(EU), Chile, China, Czech Republic, Hungary and Venezuela between 2002
and 2003 stemmed from the earlier safeguards imposed by the US on steel.
These countries believed that increase in the import restrictions of steel
industry in the US lead to a gravitation of steel to their domestic market
from the rest of the World. Hence, trade deflection contributes to the
proliferation of worldwide AD filings, which in turns causes a depression in
global trade. Moreover, World Trade Organization (WTO) section 16.8 allows
a WTO member to impose a “China safeguard” on a product imported from
China if the same product has already been targeted by another WTO
member. Although this China-specific radical section is built on the threat
that one country’s imposition of import restriction against China deflects
Chinese exports to alternative markets, empirical findings in BC (2010)
suggest no systematic evidence of trade deflection for Chinese products
targeted by US AD duties. Another concern associated with trade deflection
is the practice of deliberately exporting goods to one country through a
transit country in order to avoid import taxes. To guard against this type of
exporting behavior, countries engaging in regional trade agreements use
protocols for intra-regional trade in order to make sure that particular
product originates from within the region.18
18

See, Article 12 of The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
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As there is no evidence of

trade deflection at the product-level in

China, BC (2010) also mentions that this could relate to the fact that China is
a “new” entrant to the global trading system and Chinese firms have not yet
set up necessary networks to deflect trade to alternate markets.19 However
plausible their argument is, the product-level feature of their dataset does
not allow them to explore the linkage between firms’ previous exporting
status in different markets and trade deflection. It is highly likely that
Japanese firms which were serving more markets compared to their Chinese
counterparts could deflect their trade to alternative destinations. In addition,
some Chinese firms might have deflected their shipments to some of their
trading partners, which would not be captured when the exports are
aggregated to product level. In the presence of sunk start-up costs of
exporting, it is difficult for the exporters to sell their products in alternative
markets if they have not setup ongoing trading relationships in multiple
markets. This argument is impossible to analyze without breaking down the
firm exports by exported products and export destinations. In this regard, our
rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore the variation in exports
within firm across different destinations when there is a change in trade
barrier for a particular product.

19 China granted membership in the WTO in 2001 and BC (2010) investigates the preaccession period of China to WTO.
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It should be highlighted that AD duties provide a useful way of
examining trade deflection. Antidumping duties yield substantial changes in
trade flows given the fact that they are on average 10 to 20 times higher than
the most favored nation (MFN) tariffs.20 Besides, AD duty is a product and a
market specific trading cost for a firm. For example, if Mexican AD agencies
impose an AD duty on Brazilian cotton shirt exporters, neither the other
textile shirt exporters of Brazil nor the cotton shirt exporters of Argentina
will be affected by this discriminatory policy adjustment. Hence, if a firm
sells multiple products to a destination, it burdens paying AD duties only for
that particular product which is targeted by the importer country. Since our
analysis is based on attractive source of variation in the value of exports
within firm-product combinations across export destinations, these product
specific shocks for the firms in different export markets perfectly fits
perfectly into our research question. Alongside this, Brazil is a well-suited
country for such an analysis for number of reasons. First, as mentioned
earlier, highly disaggregated firm-level data of Brazilian exports makes
Brazil an outstanding case for this research. Second, Brazilian exported
products were frequently targeted by AD duty over the period of our sample.
There are 51 AD cases filed against Brazil in this period, 40 of which resulted
affirmatively. Moreover, these affirmative cases correspond to 120 unique sixdigit HS products. Finally, countries which imposed AD duty on Brazilian
20

See Prusa (2001).
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exported products accounts for almost 50% of the Brazil’s total exports
in1997. This allows us to expect a dramatic impact of AD duties imposed by
these countries on the trade flows of Brazilian firms to third countries. Table
2.1 documents the products subject to AD duties and the duty imposing
countries between 1994 and 2000.
Our main findings in this study can be summarized as follows.
Imposition of an AD duty on Brazilian HS six-digit products leads to a 2533% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to alternative
countries where the firms previously exported the same product. Besides, it
results in a 9% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to the
countries where the firms exported another product. On the contrary, there is
no significant effect of AD duties on the exports of the particular product to
alternative countries the firm did not serve before. Further, exploring the
extensive margin of trade deflection, we demonstrate that imposition of an
AD duty against Brazilian exported products increases the probability of the
targeted firms to introduce the particular product to a new market they
previously served. When targeted by an AD duty in an export market, a
firm’s probability to start exporting the “duty imposed product” in an
alternative destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported to
that destination. However, we find no such evidence for the countries to
which the firm did not export before.
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These findings shed light on the role of the past trading relationships
on trade deflection and strongly support the sunk start-up costs argument on
the heterogeneity of trade deflection to different countries. In line with the
earlier studies on the entry to international markets with sunk costs21, the
results obtained employing the export data of Brazilian firms suggests that
firms are more willing to deflect their shipments to their ongoing trading
partners instead of starting to export to a different destination in order to
avoid paying the market specific start-up costs such as learning the
bureaucratic procedures of exporting to a country.22 In addition, for the
countries that the firm served before, the magnitude of trade deflection is
found to be higher to the ones the firm exported the same product compared
to the ones the firm exported another product. This heterogeneity in the
results for the firms, which have different types of product-level trading
relationships in an export destination, can be attributed to the productmarket specific start-up costs such as adapting the product in a particular
destination.
To date, empirical evidence using firm-level data on AD policy is
scarce. Konings and Vandenbussche (henceforth KV) (2008) estimate the
effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-

21

See Melitz (2003) and Roberts and Tybout (1997)

One example in this category is the “Importer Security Filing” rule which recently went
into effect in the US.
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competing firms in the EU. Belderbos (1997) illustrates the relationship
between EU and US antidumping measures and foreign direct investment
through

a

micro-econometrical

analysis

of

Japanese

firms’

plant

establishments in the electronics industry. In a noticeably detailed analysis,
Pierce (2009) investigates the plant-level responses to AD measures for the
protected plants in the US. KV (2009) remains the only firm-level study of
AD policy to analyze the value of export sales and the extensive margin of
exports. Although related, our paper conceptually distinguishes from KV
(2009) for two reasons. First, their study focuses on the effect of France’s own
imposed AD duties on the exports of the protected firms, whereas we analyze
the effect of AD duties which targets the exporters in the international
market. Second, they exploit a two dimensional panel which does not
differentiate the product categories for the firms which exports multiple
products. Whereas, with a unique three dimensional panel data for firm,
product and destinations, the empirical analysis carried out in this paper is a
significant improvement over the previous studies. For the same reason, it is
the first attempt to use such a detailed, highly disaggregated data to analyze
the trading effects of AD protection.23
Extensive margin exploration, on the other hand, most closely related
with Alvarez et al. (2009) in terms of the effect of previous exporting on the
23 Examples of papers (among others) using firm-level export data with the information on
export destinations are: Eaton et al. (2005) and Buono (2009) for France, Manova (2009) for
China, Alvarez et al. (2009) for Chile.
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probability of exporting a new product. Employing Chilean firm-level data
which has the same features with ours (in terms of the details about
exporting activities), their study documents that a firm’s previous export
experience increases the probability that the firm will export a previously
exported product to a different market or a different product to a market
where this firm already exported a product. Both Alvarez et al. and our study
clearly points out that previous trading relationships which are important
determinants of new exporting activities. With respect to trade policy
implementations of extensive margin, our analysis also complements the set
of papers (including, but not limited to Debeare and Mostashari 2010, Buono
2009, Buona and Lalanne 2010, KV 2009) examining the effect of
protectionism (or liberalization) on the probability of observing new product
varieties or new firms in export markets. For the first time in the literature,
our investigation focuses on the question whether a country’s imposition of an
import restriction affects targeted firms’ probability of exporting the
particular product to alternative countries, rather than the duty imposer
country itself. This provides additional implications to analyze the effect of
trade policy on the variety of goods countries trade and on the number of
exporting firms in different countries.
Our findings also provide additional insights to analyze the effect of
trade deflection on the proliferation on AD actions around the world. For
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instance, Feinberg and Reynolds (2006, 2007) and Moore and Zanardi (2008)
speculate that the spread of AD filings may partially be explained by trade
deflection.24 As noted earlier, when exports are deflected to third countries,
these third countries might also subsequently request more import protection
in the form of AD duties. To capture this possible explanation, they use a
variable which is equal to the number of global AD cases filed the previous
year in the particular industry category. Although their estimates are
significant, this variable does not capture the true effect of trade deflection
due to the aggregation. It is not typical for a country to impose a restriction
on a product because of a surge in imports in another product within the
same industry. Second, this measure does not provide any clue about the
destinations that exports should deflect to. For instance, a high number of
AD duties imposed on steel products in North America against Mexico does
not guarantee either trade deflection for all Mexican firms or trade deflection
to all countries. As a matter of fact, it is less likely to observe a reaction from
a country, which has a small import share of steel from North America, to a
steel war in the region. Our study also raises additional concern to the WTO’s
China safeguard which allows members to deviate from MFN rule based on
the threat of trade deflection. As more disaggregated firm-level data of
exports become available, we believe that researchers should seriously focus
on the trading relationships of firms in different countries when they
We should note that the effect of trade deflection on the spread of AD filings is not the
actual research question, whereas, it is a control variable in both papers.
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evaluate the threat of trade deflection and its effect on the rise of
protectionist policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses the motivation of our empirical strategy, some preview discussion,
the formal econometric methodology and alternative estimations we
performed. In section 3 we describe the data, Section 4 documents the results.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Empirical Investigation
The classification of firm-product combinations
Participating in export markets requires sunk start-up costs of
establishing necessary networks, acquiring information about the official
procedures and adapting products. This makes the current- period export
supply dependent upon the previous exporting status, given the fact that
firms are able to continue exporting without burdening the start-up costs if
they already exported to a particular market before.25 Das et al. (2001), for
instance, provide an estimation of such costs using structural estimates for
Colombian firms and suggest that these costs are quite substantial; on
average as high as 400,000 dollars. Most models of international trade on
firm heterogeneity assume that these entry costs to export market are

25

See Dixit (1989) and, Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2001).
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constant and exogenous to the firm.26 More recently, utilizing Chilean firmlevel data Alvarez et al. (2009) uncovers sizeable heterogeneity across
destinations in the nature of entry into different markets for firm-product
combinations. Their study points out that these costs are indeed, market and
product-market specific.
We also build our empirical strategy on these start-up costs of
exporting. To do so, we classify the firms whose product is targeted by an AD
duty on the basis of their previous trading relationships to alternative
countries. Figure 1 demonstrates this classification in a three country setting.
When country A imposes an AD duty on Brazilian exporters of good X, there
are three types of firms at the time of duty imposition which are affected by
this AD measure:
•

Type 1 firm, which was exporting good X to country A and
non-exporter in country B.

•

Type 2 firm, which was exporting good X to both A and B.

•

Type 3 firm, which was an exporter of good X in country A
but exporter of another product in country B.

In order to deflect its trade to country B, type 1 firm, which did not
export to country B before, has to incur the market and product-market
specific start-up cost. However, type 3 firm does not have to incur the market
specific start-up cost in a similar scenario, given the fact that it has already
26

For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and Melitz (2003).
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served country B before. When it comes to the type 2 firm, which has an
ongoing trading relationship for good X in both countries, there is no need to
burden any start-up cost. Intuitively, deflecting trade to its trading partner
for the type 2 firm is as easy as a couple of more phone calls compared to the

type 1 firm which faces a burden of entering to a new country, contacting
potential customers and establishing necessary distribution channels to sell
its product. On the other hand, type 3 firm has a comparative advantage over

type 1 firm in terms of market specific start-up costs such as learning the
bureaucratic procedures to export to country B.
In the light of this three country setting, we classify the firm-product
combinations for the observations where good X is hit with an AD measure in
another country. To do so, we first create a dummy variable which takes on a
value of 1 if a firm-product combination is targeted by an AD duty in a
country besides the country of the unit observation. Following BC (2007), this
variable is not zero in the period in which the investigation for an affirmative
AD case is begun because of the fact that the targeted exporters begin to
respond to tentative duty imposition shortly after the date filing is
announced. Second, in order to identify the effect of previous trading
relationships of the firms, we use three different dummies for the three types
of past export status described above.27 More specifically, each AD duty
imposed in an export market creates the three country case mentioned above
27

We use three year definition to describe the firm’s past export status.
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for Brazil, the duty imposer country and the destination country of the unit
observation. Consequently, a firm-product combination might be classified as
different types in different observations at a year depending on the
destination. 28 The effect of AD duty on type 2 firm-product group represents
the intensive margin of trade deflection while, type 1 and type 3 represents
the extensive margin. Further, we also undertake an alternative estimation
for extensive margin and analyze whether the imposition of an AD duty in a
country leads the targeted type 1 and type 3 firms to introduce their
particular products in new markets.
In addition to the three types of firm-product combinations described
above, there is also another type which is indirectly affected by the duty
imposed in country A: those which were exporters of good X in B, nonexporters in A. Although the duty imposed in country A does not directly
affect them, part of the deflection in good X from country B to A can be
explained by the depressed trade of the exporters in this category. Therefore,
we also add these firm-product combinations to our classification as type 4.
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of our sample. When an AD
duty imposed on a product, we have 41% of the firm-product combinations as
type 2, 27% as type 1 and 19% as type 3. Our goal is to document the
heterogeneity of trade deflection for these different types of previous trading
relationships across destinations to analyze the potential export markets for
28 We would also write “depending on the duty imposer”. However, as shown in Table 1, there
is no single year in which more than one country imposed AD duty to the same product.
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the firms to deflect trade when their products suffer an AD duty in the
international market.
Before proceeding, a preview of this heterogeneity is shown in Figure
2.2. The vertical axis of the graph shows the mean value of the growth of
exports for firm-product combinations in the sample and the solid horizontal
line shows the sample average. In the horizontal axis, we denote our
classifications when there is an AD duty imposed in an export market other
than the particular destination. The increase in growth of exports due to an
AD duty faced in an export market except the particular destination
demonstrates the trade deflection. As shown in the figure, contrary to the
slight difference for type 1, the average of export growth is much higher for

type 2 and type 3 firm-product combinations when their product is hit with
an AD duty. This suggests that firms tend to deflect a higher volume of trade
to the countries where they already exported when their products suffer an
AD duty in an export market. On the other hand, a higher average of export
growth for type 2 firm-product combinations speaks to the influence of
exporting the same product before on deflected trade. In our empirical section
we evaluate the indicative heterogeneity shown in figure 2 and assess which
type of trading relationship provides significant trade deflection when other
factors are also taken into account.
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Empirical Specification
Trade Deflection (Export Values)
Consider first the variation in exports for a firm-product category
across export destinations. The effect of an AD duty imposed by a country on
the exports of the Brazilian firms to other countries can be interpreted as
trade deflection. In order to quantify that effect, we start with the following
reduced form equation:
+

1) +

3 ++

4 +

2 +
+

+
(1)

where f denotes a firm, p denotes a six-digit HS product, i denotes an export
destination, t denotes time in years. The variable

and

is the

) is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the particular

value of exports,

firm-product combination is hit with an AD duty in an export destination
except country i;

1,

2 and

3 and

4 are dummy variables to

indicate the past exporting status to country i at firm-product level as
described above. Type 1 takes on a value of 1 if the firm in the unit
observation is exporting the targeted product to country h before the duty
imposition, but non-exporter in country i. Type 2 is equal to 1 if the firm in
the unit observation is exporting the targeted product to both countries h and

i before the duty imposition; Type 3 is equal to 1 if the firm in the unit
observation is exporting the targeted product to country h before the duty
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imposition, non-exporter of that product but exporter of another product in
country i. Finally, Type 4 is a binary indicator if the firm in the unit
observation is non-exporter of the particular product in county h but
exporting it to country i. β2, β3 and β4 denote the magnitude of trade
deflection for each previous exporting relationship. Finally,

is a vector

of firm characteristics.
We assume that

comprises two components, a permanent firm-

product-country component and a transitory component. So the error term
satisfies:
(2)

+
where

~iid 0, σ ) and μ

~iid 0, σ ) are independent of each other. Fixed

effects (FE) estimator is one way of estimating equation (1) because it
eliminates time invariant error component, μ

. However, the greatest

econometric concern in FE estimation of equation (1) is that it results in
biased and inconsistent estimates associated with the serial correlation of
ln

and ln

with FE transformed residuals. In order to remedy

this autocorrelation, we first difference equation (1) and estimate it using the
two stage least squares/instrumental variables (IV) approach described in
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which we instrument for ∆ln
∆ln

) and

) using the multiple lags of the levels of these variables.29

29 Note that direct estimation of the first difference of equation (1) by OLS also provides
biased estimates because lagged difference of exports is correlated with the error term.
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Our IV first difference equation then becomes:
∆ln(xfpit) = β1 ∆ln(xft-1)+ β2 ∆(ADfpht * Type1) + β3 ∆(ADfpht * Type2) + β4 ∆(ADfpht
* Type3) +

∆

4 +

∆

+

∆

+∆

(3)

It should be emphasized that there are two potential problems with the
IV estimator used in estimating equation (2); bias due to the measurement
error and bias associated with the use of a weak instrument. If there is
measurement error in ln
the variables, ∆ln

and ln

), then the measurement error in

and ∆ln

), will be correlated with the

measurement error in the instruments, ln
employ alternative instruments, ln

and ln
and ln

.Therefore, we
, in consideration

that their measurement error is not correlated with the measurement error
in ∆ln

and ∆ln

.30 In addition, to test the quality of the

instruments, we estimate the first-stage model using our instruments. We
find that our instruments are strong and conclude that IV approach is
appropriate for our estimation.31 We also document the estimates for both FE
in levels and IV first difference estimation.32

30See

BC (2007) for the same argument.

31 While we do not report the results of the instrument tests to save space, the first stage
estimations are available from the author upon request.
32
An alternative strategy to estimate equation (2) would be the Generalized Method of
Moments estimation described in Arellano and Bond (1991). However, when the country-year
dummies are included for aggregate variation, this estimation becomes infeasible because of
the large number of parameters to be estimated.
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Extensive Margin of Trade Deflection
We also investigate whether the imposition of an AD duty against
Brazilian exported products in a particular export market affects the
probability that targeted firms will start to export their duty imposed
products to a new export destination. In other words, we analyze whether
type 1 and type 3 firms, which are non-exporters of the targeted product in
country i, becomes an exporter for that product as a result of an AD duty
imposed in country h. We believe that firms whose products suffer AD duty in
an export destination are more likely to start exporting their products to
alternative markets where they previously exported given the fact that they
have a comparative advantage in those markets in terms of country-specific
start-up costs. To develop an understanding of the heterogeneity to the effect
of an AD duty on the firm-product combinations of different types of previous
exporting activities, we start with the following binary choice model:
1

+

1) +

3 +
(2.4)

+
where the binary dependent variable

is equal to 1 if the firm i starts to

export product p to country i at time t. Once again, of particular interest are
the AD policy interactions. β2 can be interpreted as the change in the
probability of observing a new product in country i from the firms, which
were non-exporters in country i, when an AD duty hits their exported product
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in country h. In a similar manner, β3 shows the change in the same
probability for the firms which were exporters of another product in country i.
The most important issue in estimation (4) is the influence of
unobserved heterogeneity. There might be some permanent firm or product
attributes; or managerial skills which are correlated with the decision to
start exporting a particular product as a result of an AD duty faced in
another destination. This will yield us to overestimate the effect of our policy
interactions as these variations are not observed. There are different
alternatives to estimate the binary choice model of starting to export a
product with unobserved elements including maximum likelihood techniques
such as probit or conditional logit, or linear probability model with random or
fixed effects. For the reason that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with
our firm specific controls, random effect estimation is not appropriate for our
specification. As a result, to model the unobserved heterogeneity as fixed, we
choose to work with linear probability model. In addition, it is highly likely
that unobserved characteristics in our model are serially correlated with
ln

. Therefore, we follow a methodology similar to our earlier estimation

to correct for autocorrelation and instrument for ln

using its second

lag. We advance in two steps. First, we undertake FE estimation of equation
(4) in levels. Given the potential correlation of FE transformed residuals with
the lagged export value, we also estimate our model using IV first differences
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in order to avoid the problem of inconsistent estimates found in the fixed
effects model.
Control Variables
Exporters are found to be more productive than non-exporters.33 In line
with this, a change in exporter firm’s productivity over time might affect the
total value of its shipments over time. Therefore, our policy interactions
might capture the effect of a productivity shock at the firm level that would
be correlated with the growth in exports or the decision to start exporting the
product to a particular destination. The export data, SECEX, does not allow
us to control for productivity because it contains no information on domestic
sales. However, the lagged value of total exports proxies the productivity of
the firms.34
On the other hand, we also control for the size of the firm which is
measured by the total number of workers and the average wage bill paid by
the firm within a year. It is believed that larger firms tend to be more
productive and have higher expected profits from exporting. Moreover, as
discussed in Bernard and Jensen (2004), size may control for several factors;
larger firms might have lower average and marginal costs which cause an
increase in the likelihood of exporting, also size is a proxy for past success by
definition. Further, inclusion of the average wages paid by the exporting
firms is motivated by the fact that higher wages paid by the firm is
33
34

See Greenway and Kneller (2007) for a survey of this literature.
Alvarez et al. (2009)
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associated with higher quality of output which positively affects exporting the
goods into foreign markets. However, the limitation of using this variable is
that its availability reduces our sample from roughly 800,000 to 49,000.
The growth in exports or the decision to start exporting a product to a
particular country can also partially be explained by macroeconomic factors
in the export market. For instance, trade openness, GDP growth and
exchange rate appreciation in a potential export destination can work as an
import demand shifter which would induce exporters to deflect their
shipments to that destination. In this regard, we use country-year dummies
to control for macroeconomic aggregates.
Data
Export data comes from the Brazilian customs office SECEX
(Secretaria de Comércio Exterior ) which gathers export reports by product
code at the plant, month and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul )
level. The NCM codes are 8-digit numbers, of which the first six digits
coincide with the first six digits in the Harmonized System. The destination
information is mapped from Brazilian country codes into the international
ISO system. Product codes at the 6-digit level in the Brazilian data, for which
there exists no corresponding Harmonized System entries, are removed from
the data. All export values in the SECEX data are reported in current U.S.
dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We utilize observations on exporting
plants, declared export values and export destinations for the years 1994
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through 2000. We aggregate monthly plant-level export information to years
and firms. Export sales are deflated to their August-1994 equivalents using
the monthly U.S. consumer price index (from Global Financial Data).
The employment and wage data of Brazilian firms are obtained from
the collection of annual reports with individual information on workers and
employees, which is called RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais).
Similar to our treatment of the export data, we aggregate the monthly
worker-plant information to years and firms. We use the reported December
wage, which is recorded in multiples of the “monthly minimum wage” that
prevails at the time. The reported December wage in RAIS excludes the
“thirteenth salary,” which is a special December payment made in some
sectors. Multiplying our reported December wage figures by twelve provides a
good estimate of an annual wage. We calculate the wage value in Brazilian
Real (BRL) and deflate all wages to August 1994.35
Finally, the data on AD is obtained from Global Antidumping
Database.36 This database provides detailed product level information on the
AD petitions such as the initiation date, the decision date, the targeted
country, and the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes of
the products subject to filings. AD duties are not homogenous for countries
and products; rather they can take the form of price undertaking, an ad
35 See Molina and Muendler (2009) and Hirakawa et al. (2010) for more information about
SECEX and RAIS data.
36

http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/
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valorem duty or a specific duty in different cases. Consequently, we use a
dummy variable to identify the effect of AD given the different units in AD
duties across cases and countries.
Empirical Results
The results from estimating equation (3) are shown in Table 2.3. In the
first two columns, we do not include the AD policy interactions with previous
exporting status, whereas we only use the AD duty dummy to compare the
results with the specifications which include the interactions. As shown, our
full sample has 548698 observations, however, adding the number of
employees to regressions reduces the sample to roughly 460,000 and using
the wage bill further reduces the sample to around 50,000. All specifications
include country-year dummies to control for aggregate variation at the
country level over time. In addition, based on the F-tests obtained in the first
stage, we conclude that all of our instrumental variables are strong and our
estimates are unbiased.
Consider first specifications (1) and (2). Looking at the insignificant
estimates of the AD duty imposed on a HS six-digit product in specifications
(1) and (2), we would conclude that AD duties does not cause trade deflection
in our sample. However, interaction of the AD policy variable with the
previous exporting status of the firms for the targeted product provides
interesting outcomes in terms of trade deflection. Specification (3) through (5)
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documents the estimates for the AD duty interactions. Specification (4)
controls for the size and specification (5) controls for both the size and the
average wage bill. The estimates in these specifications provide strong
evidence for the heterogeneity of the effect of AD duty on deflected trade for
different types of previous exporting relationships. As shown, when there is
an AD duty imposed on Brazilian exported products, there is no significant
trade deflection to the countries where the firm was non-exporter before.
However, the significant estimates of the coefficients on AD duty interactions
with type 2 and type 3 suggests that firms whose product suffer an AD duty
in a particular export destination, deflect their trade to alternative countries
where they exported before. Although the coefficient on AD duty interaction
with type 3 turns to be insignificant in specification (5), we do not observe
whether it is due to the additional control we use or due to the decrease in
our sample size. On the other hand, the significance of the variable
2) is insensitive to the choice of control variables.
To better quantify the magnitude of trade deflection, we use the
formula in Kennedy (1981) to convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to
its true marginal effect. The result developed in his paper papers suggests
that if the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, α is the estimated
coefficient on a dummy variable and V(α) is the estimated variance of α then:

p = 100 (exp(α - V(α)/2) - 1)
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(5)

gives us an estimate of the percentage impact of the dummy variable on the
variable being explained. The estimates in Table 3 demonstrates that
imposition of a trade restriction in the form of an AD measure on a Brazilian
HS product results in a % 18 increase in the firms’ exports of the targeted
product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported that
product. Trade deflection resulting from an AD duty is also remarkably
higher to the countries where firms exported the targeted product compared
to the countries where the firm did export another product. The coefficient
estimates on

3

in Table 3 suggests that imposition of an AD

duty leads to an 8% increase in the firms’ exports of the targeted product to
the countries where the firms were non-exporter for the duty imposed
product, but exporter of another product.
In conclusion to table 2.3, the insignificant coefficient estimate of
1 points out that start-up costs of exporting plays a crucial
role in determining the potential export market to deflect trade for the firms
whose product suffer an AD duty in a particular destination. This is also
closely related to the temporary feature of the AD duties. It would be
reasonable for a targeted firm to deflect its trade to a country they never
exported before as a result of a permanent change in a particular country’s
trade policy. However, the cost of the temporary adjustment in trade policy in
the form of an AD duty in an export market does not seem enough to offset
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the start-up costs in another destination. In addition, the sizable increase in
the growth of exports of the targeted products to the countries where the
firms of those products have ongoing trading relationships is a further
support to the start-up cost argument. Last but not least, the difference in
coefficient

estimates

between

2

and

3

highlight the importance of product-market specific start-up costs in firms'
decision to deflect trade to third countries when their product is hit with an
AD duty in a particular destination.
estimate of

Further, the negative coefficient

4 also speaks to the trade depressing effect of AD

duty in the markets rather than the duty imposer. This shows that part of
the deflection in trade is also due to the trade depression that some exporters
(those whose products were not hit in country h) experienced in the
alternative markets.
When it comes to control variables, all of them have predicted signs.
The increase in the total export of firms in the previous year, the size which
is measured by number of workers and the average wage bill is associated
with a current export growth for a product category within firm. Since they
are not of particular interest, we do not discuss them here in detail.37
In what follows, we also report the FE results in levels in Table 2.4 to
provide a comparison on the IV first difference estimates we obtained,.
37

We do the same for the remaining tables.
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Neither the sign nor the significance of the variables is changed.
1) remains to be insignificant in all specifications. On the contrary, both
2 and

are significant despite their lower

3

magnitude compared to the IV first difference estimation. This might indicate
that controlling for firm-product-destination fixed effects absorbed much of
the deflecting effect of the AD duties. FE estimation also reduced the
coefficient estimates for the lagged

export values and other firm

characteristics.
Our final robustness check aims to address the concern that the
deflecting effect of an AD duty might be particularly resulting from steel
cases; given the fact that steel industry is the most frequently targeted
industry as shown in Table 2.1. For that purpose, we add interactions of the
AD policy variable with an indicator for whether the particular product is a
steel or non-steel product.38 As documented in Table 2.5, including steel and
non-steel interaction terms does not alter our results. Similarly, we find no
evidence of trade deflection to the countries where firms did not export before
both for steel and non-steel products. In contrast, there is a significant trade
deflection to the countries where the firms had previous trading relationships
for both product categories.

38

Steel products are HS chapter 72 or 73.
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With respect to the magnitude of trade deflection, coefficient estimates
in Table 2.5 shows that trade deflection to the countries where the firms have
type 2 trading relationship is higher for steel products compared to non-steel
ones. Imposition of an AD duty against Brazilian exported products yields a
19% increase in firms’ exports of targeted steel product to the countries
where the firms exported the particular product before. For non-steel
products, the increase in exports to the same set of countries is 16%. Further,
when targeted by an AD duty in the export market, the increase in firms’
exports to alternative markets where the firms served with another product
is 5% for steel products and 10% for non-steel products. This higher effect of
the interaction of non-steel dummy suggests that steel producers faced higher
product specific start-up costs in export markets. This can also be attributed
to the fact that steel exporters, which suffer an AD duty in a particular
country, recognize the potential AD investigation they might face in another
country

given the fact that steel products accounts for the highest share in

the total worldwide AD filings. Non-steel exporters, on the other hand, have
less risk in terms of the same concern.
Having analyzed the trade deflection using export values, we report
the results for the extensive margin of trade deflection in Tables 2.6 through
2.8. In these specifications the binary dependent variable takes on a value of
1 if the firm starts to export a particular product to a new export destination.
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The policy variable and its interactions assist us to identify whether the firms
start to export a particular duty imposed product to an alternative
destination. Table 2.6 documents the results of the linear probability model
using IV first difference estimation. Once again, specifications (1) and (2)
include the number of employees and the last specification includes the
average bill. F-test statistics obtained in the first stage implies that all of our
instrumental variables are strong and our estimates are unbiased. Similar to
the earlier results on trade deflection using export values, using the AD
policy variable without interactions yields insignificant estimates as shown in
specifications (1) and (2). In contrast, estimates in the specifications (3)
through (5) provides a diversity for the effect of the imposed AD duties on the
probability of starting to export the targeted product to a new country when
the policy variable is interacted with type 1 and type 3 previous trading
relationships.
First, insignificant estimates of AD policy interaction with type 1
indicates that AD duties imposed on a particular exported product does not
affect the probability that firms start to export the targeted product to a new
market where they were non-exporter of that product in the past. On the
other hand, the coefficient estimates for

3 suggest that the

probability of observing a new firm-product combination in an export
destination, where the firm already served with another product, is increased
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by 8-10% if an AD duty is imposed on the particular product in a different
export destination.
To summarize, the effect of an AD duty imposed on a product by a
country on the extensive margin of export flows to the third countries only
appears in the form of existing exporters exporting the particular duty
imposed product to the countries where they were serving via another
product before. In contrast, we do not observe any effect on the probability
that non-exporter of any product in a country starts to export a product which
is hit with an AD duty in another country. This emphatically points out that
suffering temporary AD duties in an export destination is not sufficient to
trigger the firm to bear a whole burden of “market” and “product specific”
start-up cost of exporting the targeted product to a different destination.
However, it causes the targeted firms to burden a product-specific start-up
cost for their targeted products in an export market they already served.
Overall, Table 2.6 demonstrates that the role of past exporting status is
clearly evident for the extensive margin of trade deflection to third countries
resulting from an AD duty.
Table 2.7 shows the results of the FE estimates for the extensive
margin of trade deflection. Similar to the earlier findings, the only difference
of the FE estimation is that it generated slightly lower coefficients for the
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independent variables. However, neither the sign nor the significance of the
coefficients changed.
One might be concerned that the estimates for the extensive margin of
trade deflection are driven particularly by steel products. For this
consideration, we include the steel and non-steel interactions in order to
separate out the effect of AD duty. The results of this specification are
reported in Table 2.8. As shown, while the interaction of the AD duty with
the type 1 trading relationship is insignificant for both steel and non-steel
products, the type 3 interaction is significant for both. Interestingly, the size
of the increase in the probability to start exporting to the countries where the
firms were exporters of another product is much higher for non-steel
products. When hit with an AD duty, the probability that the firm will start
exporting the targeted product to a destination they have already served
increases by 4-7% for non-steel products; whereas, it increases by 1.5% - 1.8%
for steel products.

This is also parallel to our earlier estimates of trade

deflection using export values. Steel exporters seem to face a higher product
specific start-up costs as a result of the political sensitivity of the steel
industry in terms of import protection.
Conclusion
Trade deflection has become an important issue in the WTO and other
Customs Unions’ framework. From China specific safeguards to intra67

regional trade protocols, there are many examples of policy debates regarding
this issue. This paper represents the first attempt to utilize a rich three
dimensional customs data of firms, products and export destinations to
analyze the effect of past exporting relationships on trade deflection resulting
from AD duties which targets Brazilian exported products during the 19942000 period. We document substantial heterogeneity of trade deflection to the
countries depending on targeted firms’ previous trading relationships. First,
using the export values, we show that imposition of an AD duty on Brazilian
products leads to an 18% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular
product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported that
product and an 8% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to
the countries where the firms exported another product. To the contrary, we
find no significant effect of AD duties on the exports of the firms’ particular
product to alternative countries the firm did not export before. This clearly
demonstrates that firms are more willing to deflect trade to their ongoing
trading partners instead of starting to export to a different destination in
order to avoid paying the market specific start-up costs. In addition, the
higher magnitude of deflected trade to the countries the firm exported the
same product compared to the countries the firm exported another product,
points out the role of product-market specific start-up costs of exporting for
the decision to deflect shipments to alternative destinations. Further,
exploring the extensive margin of trade deflection, we demonstrate that
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imposition of an AD duty against Brazil increases the probability that
Brazilian firms will introduce the particular product to a new market they
previously served. When targeted by an AD duty in an export market, a
firm’s probability to start exporting the duty imposed product in a different
destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported to that
destination. However, our estimates show no such evidence for the countries
to which the firm did not export before. We also show that estimated trade
deflection varies for steel and non-steel products, which is the result of the
political sensitivity of the steel products in terms of AD investigations.
Our paper also paves the way for a more detailed exploration of trade
deflection using the firm level data in order to better understand the trading
effects of AD policy not only for the duty imposer and the targeted country
but also for the third countries which are not named in the investigation. In
addition, we also point out a new perspective to examine the relationship
between trade deflection and the spread of worldwide AD filings. We believe
that researchers and policy makers should focus more on exporting firms’
past trading relationships when evaluating the threat of trade deflection to
the rules and bindings of World trading system.
Another related question regarding our paper is that whether the
targeted firms switch exported products in the duty imposer country when
they deflect their trade to different destinations or whether the imposition of
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an AD duty in a country affects the firms’ exports of another product, rather
than the targeted one, because of trade deflection. While our focus in this
paper is the effect of past trading relationships on trade deflection, analyzing
the trading effects of AD in terms of these related topics is an attractive
avenue for future research.
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Table 2.1. Antidumping duties imposed on Brazil
Case

Imposing country

Product

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

USA
USA
USA
USA
Australia
Australia
Canada
European Union
India
Mexico
European Union
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
USA
Mexico
Peru
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
European Union
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
South Africa
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Canada
Canada
European Union

Stainless Steel Wire Rod
Ferrosilicon
Silicomanganese
Stainless Steel Bar
A4 Cut Ream Copy Paper
Fibreglass Gun Rovings
Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet
Pig Iron (Hematite)
Bisphenol-A
Specialty Steel Products
Ferro-Silico Manganese
Hot-Rolled Steel
Steel Sheets
Cold-Rolled Steel
Steel Plates In Rolls
Corrugated Iron Sheets
Butyl Rubber
Pressure Pipe
Steel Connectors
Calcium Carbide
Chain Saws
Ceramic Magnets
Fuses
Suspension PVC
Gas Carafe
Fiber Optic Cables
Monosodium Glutamate
Uncoated wood-free paper
Chains
Abrasives
Flat Laminated Products
Cut paper (A4)
Eviscerated Chicken
Javelins
Denim
Steel Sheets
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate
Stainless Steel Round Bar
Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings

1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
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Figure 2.1: Exporting status of the firms before the duty imposition

A

AD duty on product

B

Brazil

Type 1 Firm
Type 2 Firm
Type 3 Firm

Trade flows for the products.

72

Figure 2.2: Mean value of the growth of ln(exp)fpi

Source: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS Notes: Mean value
of the growth of ln(exp)fpi is in the horizontal axis. Subscript f is a firm, p is a
6-digit HS product, i is an export market.
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Table 2.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable

Mean

Standard deviation

N

Dependent variables
∆ln(expfpit)

3.466

1.399

548698

New Product

0.370

0.042

548698

ADdutyt * type1

0.197

0.301

548698

ADdutyt * type2

0.080

0.167

548698

ADdutyt * type3

0.053

0.082

548698

ADdutyt * type4

0.037

0.066

548698

∆ln(expft)

0.025

0.543

548698

∆ln(employment)ft

3.467

4.284

548698

∆(wagebill)ft*

-0.0576

0.514

461638

Explanatory variables

Source: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS.
Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export
market,t is a year. * millions of BRL.
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Table 2.3. IV First Difference Estimation
Dependent variable: ∆ln(expfpit)

AD duty

1

2

-1.119
(0.35)

-1.087
(0.57)

3

AD duty*type1
AD duty*type2
AD duty*type3
AD duty*type4
ln(expfpit-1)
ln(expft-1)

0.203
(36.52)***
0.075
(12.25)***

0.288
(36.54)***
0.074
(10.23)***
0.125
(17.95)***

Yes
548698

Yes
461638

ln(empft)

4

-1.509
(0.87)
0.172
(20.35)***
0.072
(2.99)**
-0.119
(2.89)**
0.203
(37.45)***
0.089
(24.54)***

-1.484
(0.67)
0.171
(18.70)***
0.075
(2.87)**
-0.091
(2.85)**
0.283
(36.33)***
0.084
(26.65)***
0.110
(13.98)***

Yes
548698

Yes
491638

Avg.wage
Country – year
Observations

5

-1.023
(0.45)
0.134
(4.80)***
0.115
(0.56)
-0.115
(2.65)**
0.187
(23.36)***
0.069
(13.65)***
0.213
(6.59)***
0.000
(1.99)**
Yes
49176

Notes: Tables 2.3 – 2.8: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market,
t is a year. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ). ***, **, * show the level of
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant term
which is suppressed.
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Table 2.4. Fixed Effects Estimation (Levels)

AD duty

1
-0.041
(0.36)

2
-0.032
(0.29)

AD duty*type1
AD duty*type2
AD duty*type3
AD duty*type4
ln(expfpit-1)
ln(expft-1)

0.038
(87.62)***
0.026
(18.44)***

0.041
(86.54)***
0.024
(17.69)***
0.092
(5.49)***

Yes
548698

Yes
461638

ln(empft)

3

4

5

-0.104
(0.89)
0.127
(16.71)***
0.037
(7.32)***
-0.016
(0.29)
0.044
(86.16)***
0.032
(10.65)***

-0.184
(0.72)
0.127
(16.15)***
0.026
(6.72)***
-0.015
(0.76)
0.045
(85.03)***
0.042
(9.65)***
0.084
(8.45)***

Yes
548698

Yes
491638

-0.107
(0.65)
0.129
(4.11)**
0.024
(0.92)
-0.014
(0.73)
0.032
(67.34)*
0.019
(7.86)**
0.146
(7.65)**
0.000
(4.37)**
Yes
49176

Avg.wage
Country – year
Observations
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Table 2.5. IV First Difference Estimation
(Steel vs. Non-steel Products)
Dependent variable: ∆ln(expfpit)

AD duty*type1*non-steel
AD duty*type2* non-steel
AD duty*type3* non-steel
AD duty*type4* non-steel
AD duty*type1*steel
AD duty*type2* steel
AD duty*type3* steel
AD duty*type4*non-steel
ln(expfpit-1)
ln(expft-1)

1

2

3

-1.551
(0.65)
0.159
(21.55)***
0.091
(16.22)***
-0.093
(1.97)*
-2.091
(0.36)
0.185
(18.85)***
0.049
(16.22)***
-0.112
(2.01)**
0.220
(27.70)***
0.085
(21.05)***

-1.691
(0.76)
0.145
(20.84)***
0.087
(11.76)***
-0.091
(1.98)*
-2.010
(0.40)
0.188
(18.21)***
0.046
(2.44)**
-0.124
(1.99)*
0.209
(26.00)***
0.080
(20.17)***
0.127
(25.79)***

Yes
548698
0.14

Yes
461638
0.14

-1.443
(0.52)
0.127
(4.18)***
0.083
(0.75)
-0.087
(0.65)
-1.879
(0.25)
0.167
(2.17)**
0.043
(0.55)
-0.093
(0.47)
0.226
(4.47)***
0.096
(3.26)***
0.231
(7.59)***
0.001
(4.66)***
Yes
49176
0.19

ln(empft)
Avg.wage
Country – year dummies
Observations
R2
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Table 2.6. IV First Differences Estimation of Extensive Margin

AD duty

1
0.001
(0.34)

2
0.001
(0.32)

AD duty*type1
AD duty*type3
ln(expft-1)

0.021
(3.16)***

0.023
(3.27)***
0.001
(2.20)**

Yes
893405
0.29

Yes
548698
0.27

ln(empft)

3

4

5

-0.031
(0.57)
0.105
(2.23)**
0.022
(6.15)***

-0.009
(0.76)
0.082
(2.17)**
0.021
(7.27)***
0.001
(2.01)**

Yes
893405
0.24

Yes
548698
0.28

-0.006
(0.98)
0.098
(1.98)**
0.026
(2.88)***
0.001
(2.22)**
0.001
(12.79)***
Yes
49176
0.30

Avg.wage
Country – year dummies

Observations
R2

Note: Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p
to country c
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Table 2.7. Fixed Effects Estimation of Extensive Margin
Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p to
country c

AD duty
AD duty*type1
AD duty*type3
ln(expft-1)
ln(empft)

1
0.001
(0.34)

2
0.001
(0.59)

3

4

5

-0.078
(0.22)
0.081
(199.50)**
*
0.012
0.012
0.012
(278.07)*** (281.40)*** (288.07)**
*
0.000
(2.05)**

-0.068
(0.39)
0.068
(204.63)**
*
0.012
(234.29)**
*
0.000
(0.88)

-0.043
(0.54)
0.074
(14.44)***

Yes
893405
0.29

Yes
548698
0.38

Avg.wage
Country – year
Observations
R2

Yes
548698
0.30
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Yes
893405
0.34

0.022
(617.38)*
**
0.001
(3.17)***
0.000
(14.77)***
Yes
49176
0.35

Table 2.8. IV First Differences Estimation of Extensive Margin

AD duty*type1*nonsteel
AD duty*type3*nonsteel
AD duty*type1*steel
AD duty*type3*steel
ln(expft-1)

1
-1.005
(0.32)
0.071
(230.45)***
-0.070
(0.49)
0.018
(8.28)***
0.068
(682.60)***

2
-1.005
(0.37)
0.068
(238.34)***
-0.089
(0.36)
0.015
(8.99)***
0.067
(651.87)***
0.003
(8.74)***

Yes
893405

Yes
548698

3
-0.907
(0.26)
0.027
(15.82)***
-0.065
(0.47)
0.016
(1.96)**
0.077
(262.50)***
0.012
(5.63)***
0.001
(5.63)***
Yes
49176

0.29

0.28

0.30

ln(empft)
Avg.wage
Country – year dummies
Observations
R2

Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p to
country c
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CHAPTER 3
RETALIATION THREATS AND THE QUALITY OF EXPORTS
Introduction
The last two decades witnessed rising administrative protection via
antidumping (AD) measures. When countries negotiate lower tariffs in trade
agreements, domestic industries that desire protection against imports can
still use several methods to gain temporary protection. The most popular of
these methods is to claim that the trade partner is dumping, or selling below
the “fair value”. This claim is often made and often generates temporary
protection, even if it is not true [Konings and Vandenbusche (2008) and
Aggarwal (2007)]. Antidumping is a very effective loophole that has been
exploited by developed as well as developing countries.39 According to the
records of Global Antidumping Database, roughly 4,500 AD petitions have
been filed in the last 20 years by more than 40 countries.
Much of the existing studies propose a number of political and
strategic considerations to explain the proliferation of AD, albeit an ideal
case aims to hinder unfair competition in the international market. One of
these proposed explanations is that countries tend to retaliate against the
countries which previously named them in their AD investigations. [Miranda
et al. (1998), Prusa and Skeath (2002), Francois and Niels (2004), Feinberg
39

See Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for an extensive survey.

81

and Reynolds (2006)] These studies suggest that this tit-for-tat strategy for
AD actions has created an “AD club” which consists of countries which have
implemented AD law and actively utilizing it. Blonigen and Bown (2003), on
the other hand, provide another perspective to this debate. They propose that
the worldwide spread of AD in fact may dampen AD activity given the fact
that countries become able to retaliate when they start enforcing this law.
Concentrating on the US AD activity, they show that the risk of a potential
reaction from the target country decreases the probability of observing AD
petition from the US industries as well as the likelihood of an affirmative AD
outcome from the US AD agency. Although whether the retaliation enables or
dampens the spread of worldwide AD activity is widely examined, nothing is
known about the exporter firms’ response to a threat of AD retaliation. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper to address this issue.
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of potential AD measures
(from retaliation) on the quality of products that are exported to the markets
which may file AD. Our idea is that when products are vertically
differentiated and price of the goods represents the level of quality, exporting
firms will increase the quality of their exports to the countries whose
importers are subject to an AD investigation because of the risk of being
retaliated for that AD investigation. Using rich three dimensional customs
data of Brazilian firms which allows us to see the quality heterogeneity
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across export destinations within the same firm-product groups; we find that
potential AD reaction from a particular export destination significantly
increases the quality of exported products to the same destination.
Several studies stressed that a major concern regarding the AD
investigations is that they do not take into consideration the quality
differentials when evaluating the price discrimination in “like products”. For
instance, Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) and Vandenbussche and
Wauthy (2001) note the objections on AD duty impositions of European
Commission from the exporters whose products were in low quality standards
and have poor brand image compared to their European competitors. These
studies point out that dumping reflects a “cost advantage” instead of “unfair
trade”. However, since no quality adjustments are made, exporters of the lowquality goods, which charge lower price in order to sell their products, are
experiencing more risk of being targeted by an AD claim.40 In line with this
argument, when an AD petition is filed by domestic industries and the
exporters’ flexibility to discriminate prices between the home and the target
country is restrained because of the threat of retaliation, an expected
response from the exporting firms is to increase the quality of their
shipments, which is sold for higher prices, in order to avoid that threat. This
hypothesis is strongly supported in our empirical analysis by matching the

40

See also Nielsen and Rutkowski (2005) and Hansen and Nielsen (2009) for a similar argument.
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detailed product-level information on AD cases with highly disaggregated
export data over the years 1997-2000.
The main findings in this paper can be summarized as follows.
Potential AD claims, resulting from an AD investigation in Brazil, increases
the quality of firms’ exports within the named industry to the target
countries by 11%. Second, we also addressed the concern that a potential AD
filing in an export destination is more important for the firms for which the
named industries’ products in the target country constitute a significant
share of their total exports. Our estimates based on this interaction also show
that one standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the
firms’ products which are exposed to retaliation is associated with a 6%
increase in the quality of the exported products to the same country. Third,
we show that this effect is 4% higher for the exporters serving the developed
countries. This can be attributed to the fact that due to the negligence of
quality differences in AD investigations, firms exporting to the developed
countries are more responsive to the retaliation risk because of the higher
quality production and higher prices charged for the like products in these
countries. Last but not least, we also show that the increase in the quality of
exported varieties as a result of retaliation threats is 3% higher to the heavy
AD user countries. This last finding shows that exporters consider the high
potential of retaliation in those countries associated with their past AD
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activity and increase the quality of their exports in their markets more than
they do in the ones with average AD activity.
Our paper most closely complements the recent work of Konings and
Vandenbussche (2009) which examines the effect of France’s own imposed AD
duties on the export sales of the protected firms. Employing firm-level
customs data of French exporters, they show that foreign sales of the
exporters decrease dramatically for the protected firms. In presenting the
arguments on the decrease in the exports of the protected firms, they also
point out that this might be the consequence of the limitations of price setting
in the international market stemming from the AD protection in the home
market. Similar to theirs, our analysis also focuses on the effect of own AD
activity on the exports market than the domestic market. However, there are
two key points that differs our work. First, they use a difference in difference
approach to see the effect of AD on the exports of the protected firms
compared to a control group of unprotected ones. In contrast, our focus is not
the effect of the AD protection in the home market, but the threat of
retaliation because of the ongoing AD investigation, regardless of its
tentative outcome. Prusa (2001) shows that exporters react to a tentative AD
duty imposition right after the AD investigation is filed and AD filings reduce
the imports of the named countries even if they are not affirmative. From this
point of view, investigations themselves trigger the retaliatory incentives of
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the target country.41 Second, our analysis is based on the trading effects of
the own AD activity in a particular export destination, namely the target
country of the investigation at home, rather than the entire international
market. In this regard, the three dimensional information on firms, products
and export destinations in our data perfectly fits into our research question.
Although conceptually different, this study is also related to the group
of papers which analyze the effect of trade policy on the quality of imported
varieties. One of the more well-known works on quality upgrading is from
Feenstra (1988) who presented evidence that US imposed import quota
restraints resulted in substantial upgrading in Japanese car imports. His
findings suggest that Japanese firms substituted toward high quality given
the restriction on their quantity of shipments. Das and Donnenfeld (1987),
Krishna (1987), Herguera et al. (2000) and Toshimitsu (2005) also
theoretically supported the argument that the average quality increases with
the trade restriction that exporters face. For the first time in the literature,
our focus is the quality upgrading resulting from a potential trade restriction
rather than the imposed one. In this respect, AD duties offer a useful starting
point given the incremental strategic motivations behind their world-wide
implementations.

41

Studies on retaliation and AD also use the filing behaviors as the dependent variable.
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It is also worth noting that, besides its rich firm-level export data,
Brazil is a suitable country for our analysis in terms of its AD activity as
well. Having implemented the AD law in 1987, Brazil ranks in the top ten
out of all World Trade Organization (WTO) members in the category of
number of AD petitions filed after the WTO’s inception in 1995. Brazil filed
71 AD cases over the sample of our data. In addition, as documented in Table
3.1, Brazil targeted its major trading partners which are also very active AD
users. Brazil also seems to be a member of the “AD club” given the fact that
almost all of these countries also targeted Brazil over the same time period in
several cases. Therefore, considering the threat of AD retaliation is an
important point for the exporters not only because of the dramatic impact of
AD duties on trade flows but also because of the target countries’ past AD
activities against Brazil. In table 3.2, we also document the AD petitions of
Brazil by three-digit ISIC industries. In line with the world-wide AD
activities, chemicals and iron-steel industries dominate the filings which are
followed by food, textile and rubber products industries.42
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section
describes the data, in section three we present the empirical methodology and
and results, we conclude with section four.

Although chemicals industry (ISIC 351) represents the 38% of total AD filings, the firmproduct combinations of this industry constitute only 2 % of our sample.
42
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Data
We employ the detailed export data of Brazilian customs office SECEX
(Secretaria de Comércio Exterior ) which gathers export reports by product
code at the plant, month and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul )
level. The NCM codes are eight-digit numbers, of which the first six digits
coincide with the first six digits in the Harmonized System. The destination
information is mapped from Brazilian country codes into the international
ISO system. The product codes at the six-digit level in the Brazilian data, for
which there exist no corresponding Harmonized System entries, are removed
from the data. All export values in the SECEX data are reported in current
U.S. dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We use observations on exporting
plants, declared export values, export destinations and export quantities and
we aggregate monthly plant-level export information to years and firms. We
only focus on the manufactured products. The main variable of interest in our
analysis is the unit price of the exported good p, shipped by firm f to
destination d which is;
(1)
Following the common practice in the international trade literature,
we use this variable to proxy the quality of exported products. Our sample
covers between years 1997 and 2000 given the fact that export quantities are
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available only for this time period. Besides, we removed all observations if
the export value is zero and there is no information on quantity of shipments.
The employment data of Brazilian firms is obtained from RAIS
(Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais) which is the collection of annual
reports with individual information on workers and employees. Similarly, we
aggregate the monthly worker-plant information to years and firms.
Finally, the data on AD activity is obtained from Global Antidumping
Database.43 This database provides detailed case level information on the AD
initiations and outcomes such as the date of the initiation and the decision,
the target country, the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS
codes of the products subject to filings. To match the six-digit HS products
with their three-digit ISIC codes, we used the concordances in the Trade
Production and Protection Database of the World Bank.
Empirical Methodology and Results
Baseline Specification
As discussed, we are primarily interested in the variation of Brazilian
firms’ export unit values within products across the export destinations. To
quantify the effect of the threat of retaliation on the quality of exports
shipped, we begin with estimating the following baseline equation:
log

43

)

+

ℎ

http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/
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)

,

+

(2)

where f denotes the firm, p denotes the six-digit HS product, d denotes the
export destination and k denotes the three-digit ISIC industry. As noted
earlier, the variable

denotes the unit prices of the exported products,

which proxies the quality of shipments.

ℎ

)

,

is a binary indicator

which takes on a value of “1” if Brazil filed an AD investigation against
country d within the three-digit ISIC industry category k in the previous year
(t-1). Since countries which have not implemented AD law have no capacity to
retaliate, this variable is zero for such countries. In addition, as shown in
Table 3.1, a number of countries from European Union (EU) were defendant
in Brazil’s AD investigations the time period of our sample. Since AD is an
EU-wide policy, we threat EU as a single country in our analysis.44
Other Considerations
We include firm-product-destination fixed effects in our specifications
to control for the firm level unobservables, such as managerial ability; to
account for the heterogeneity in the units of measurement in quantities,
which is used to create the quality index; and to control for the time invariant
country specific factors, such as distance.
In addition, as stated in Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2008), larger and more productive firms

Our results are insensitive to treating each EU country as a different market as well as
removing EU countries from the sample.
44
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pay higher wages, employ better inputs which results in higher quality in
exports. Although we do not have information on domestic sales, we use the
‘’number of workers” obtained from the linked employment data to proxy the
size of the firm.45
A recent literature (including, but not limited to Hallak 2006, Kneller
and Yu 2008, Harrigan and Deng 2008, Manova and Zhang 2010, Bastos and
Silva 2010), on the other hand, has documented that the unit value of
shipments increases with distance, size and the income of the destination
country. Therefore, part of the variation in unit export values can be
explained by these country specific covariates. In this regard, we use countryyear dummies to control for all time variant destination market aggregates,
such as GDP and exchange rate. Further, Manova and Zhang (2010)
demonstrated a positive relationship between the revenue exporters earn and
the prices they charge in the export market. For this consideration, we also
include the total revenue that the firm earns in the export destination.46
Another concern in estimating (2) is that export revenues and
quantities might be measured with error. Following the convention, we
removed the outliers as firm-product-destination combinations with export
values below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the distribution
The linked employment data also reports the wage bill paid by the firm. However, the
availability of this variable is so limited in our sample, which does not allow us to utilize.
46
While we do not report here, using total revenue that the firm earns from the same product
in the destination as an alternative measure does not alter our findings.
45
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to dampen the bias associated with the measurement error. The extensive
fixed effects our specifications also attenuates concerns with measurement
error to a certain degree.47
Results
After removing the observations with individual exporting activities,
zero values for quantities and export values, we end up with roughly 450,000
observations. All regression results are derived from a panel-data fixed effect
estimation in which the panel is a firm-product-destination triplet. All
specifications include country-year dummies to control for the aggregate
variation in the export market. Table 3.4 contains the main results from
estimating equation (2). In column (1), we report our estimates without
controls. We include our two controls, the revenue measure and the firm size,
in specifications (2) and (3) respectively. The variable “log(revenue)fdt”
denotes the total revenue that the firm f earns in the market d and the
variable “log(employment)ft” denotes the number of workers that the firm f
employs. The availability of the former determines the sample size in the last
two specifications.
As documented in table 3.4, our variable of interest, retaliation threat,
is significant in all of the specifications. This suggests that exporting firms
react to potential AD measures in an export destination by upgrading the
47

See Manova and Zhang (2010) for the same argument.
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quality of their shipments. In terms of economic magnitudes, when Brazil
files and AD investigation against the importers of an industry from a
particular country, Brazilian exporters increase the quality of the exported
products within the same industry to the named countries by 11% because of
the threat of retaliation.48 In addition, complementing the earlier studies, the
coefficient estimates of the size and the revenue variable suggests that firms
that are larger and that are generating more revenues in a destination export
higher quality of product varieties to the same destination.
Who fears more from retaliation?
The role of export share
Thus far we have shown that retaliation threats affect the quality of
the firms’ exported products to the countries subject to AD investigation in
the home country. In this section, we want to address the argument that
potential AD claims in an export destination is not equally important for all
firms. Exporting firms, for which the products of the particular industry in
the target country constitutes a significant share of their exports, would be
more responsive to the risk of retaliation. Therefore, in order to have less
exposure to retaliation, an expected response from these firms is to increase
the quality of exported products more than those of firms having smaller

We use the formula in Kennedy (1981) to convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to
its true marginal effect.
48
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export share for the same product group in the target country. In order to test
this hypothesis, we first create a variable to measure the export share which
is calculated as the ratio of firm f’s export sales of products within the
particular three-digit ISIC industry k in country d to the firm f’s total export
sales. Second, we include an interaction term between the dummy variable
which denotes the risk of retaliation and the measure of export share in our
specifications.
As shown in the first column of table 5, we obtain a significant
estimate for the interaction term. The retaliation threat variable also
remains significant. This suggests that the effect of the retaliation threats on
the quality of firms’ exports is significantly increasing in the share of the
exports of the named industries’ products shipped to the target country in the
firms’ total exports. To gauge the economic significance, consider a one
standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the firms’
products which are exposed to retaliation. Such an increase would be
associated with a 6% increase in the quality of the exported product to the
same country.
Exporters serving the richer countries
Do the firms exporting to the developed countries experience more
exposure to retaliation? The abstract of Hansen and Nielsen (2009) notes:
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The GATT/WTO rules allow for antidumping measures if
domestic producers, exposed to price discrimination, also
demonstrate injury where price-undercutting is an important
indicator of the latter. The paper shows that the procedure for
calculating injury is flawed due to negligence of quality
differences

in

undercutting.
producers

an

the
This

calculation
gives

option

to

of

the

margin
high

price-

countries

with

quality

practice

protectionism.

This

asymmetry between countries in ability to implement
antidumping measures predominantly favors the developed
countries which are specialized in producing high quality
products.

This critical view on AD investigations has important implications in
terms of our research question. Firms which export to developed countries are
experiencing tougher competition in their markets where firms produce
higher quality of products. Since the quality differentials are often ignored in
the calculation of “fair value”, the risk of being subject to an AD investigation
is higher in these countries when exporters of the lower quality products
discriminate prices in order to survive. Following this line of argument, when
retaliation threat is the focus, exporters which serve the countries richer than
Brazil will burden more risk of retaliation compared to their counterparts
which serve the less developed world. Consequently, we expect a higher
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quality upgrading for the firms serving developed markets resulting from
retaliation threats.
To examine this issue, we include an interaction term between our
policy variable and a binary indicator “Rich” which takes on a value of 1 if the
destination country is classified as a “developed country” in the World Bank’s
classification. The coefficient estimates for this specification is reported in the
second column of Table 5. The interaction term is statistically significant
along with the actual variable of interest. This clearly points out a higher
reaction to a threat of retaliation from the exporters which serve the
developed countries. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, there is a 15%
increase in the quality of the products to rich countries because of the threat
of retaliation within the industry which is subject to filing in Brazil.
Exporters serving the heavy AD users
Although AD policy is spread worldwide, some countries AD activity is
significantly higher than others. For instance, Japan, which filed the first AD
investigation in 1982, only has 6 AD petitions until 2000. On the other hand,
India, one of the latest AD law implementer, has become the heaviest AD
user in the world. Obviously, the likelihood of being retaliated is higher for
the firms serving the heavy AD users. Thus, firms might be more responsive
to the threat of retaliation in these countries given this higher risk.
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In order to investigate whether the destination countries’ AD activity
affects the quality choice of the exporting firms’ products which are exposed to
retaliation, we interact our variable of interest with another dummy variable
“Heavy” which takes on a value of 1 if the destination country’s total AD
filings is higher than the average of the total world AD filings in the previous
five years. The regression estimates obtained using this variable is reported
in the last column of Table 5. Similar to the earlier estimates, both the
retaliation threat variable and the interaction term is statistically significant.
This suggests that the increase in the quality of the exporting firms’ products
which are susceptible to retaliation is higher in the export destinations which
are heavy AD users. In terms of economic significance, there is a 13% increase
in the quality of firms’ exported products to the heavy AD users when these
countries are defendant in Brazil’s AD investigation within the same
industry.
Conclusion
Antidumping has become the most frequently implemented non-tariff
trade barrier over the years. Especially after WTO’s inception in 1995 and
the dramatic tariff cuts countries have experienced, its importance has been
increased for the firms which seek alternative instruments of protection.
Since AD duties are so large as opposed to MFN (Most favored nations)
tariffs, they have dramatic impact on both dumped imported varieties and
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domestic production. Although these effects are widely investigated in the
literature, as noted in Konings and Vandenbussche (2009), there is not much
work done on their effects on domestic exports. In this study, we examined
one channel that affects the exporters as a result of the AD investigations
filed by the domestic industry, which is the risk of retaliation.
We find strong support for the hypothesis that exporting firms will
increase the quality of their shipments to the countries named in the AD
investigations because of the risk of retaliation. Using Brazil’s customs data
of firm-level exports which has detailed information on products and export
destinations, we demonstrated a significant quality upgrading after the AD
filings in the home market from the exporting firms serving the target
countries with products within the named industry. Potential AD claims,
resulting from an AD investigation in Brazil, increases the quality of firms’
exports for the named industries’ products to the target countries by 11%.
This effect is significantly increasing in the share of the exports of the named
industries’ products in the target country in the firms’ total exports. One
standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the firms’
products which are exposed to retaliation is associated with a 6% increase in
the quality of the exported product to the same country. Further, we also
show that this effect is 4% higher for the exporters serving the developed
countries and 2% higher for the exporters serving the heavy AD users.
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Table 3.1. Brazil’s antidumping filings by industries
(1996-1999)

311
313
314
321
322
323
324
331
332
341
342
351
352
353
354
355
356
361
362
369
371
372
381
382
383
384
385
390

Three digit ISIC industry

Number of
Cases

Food products
Beverages
Tobacco
Textiles
Wearing Apparel except footwear
Leather products
Footwear except rubber or plastic
Wood products except furniture
Furniture except metal
Paper and products
Printing and publishing
Industrial chemicals
Other chemicals
Petroleum refineries
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products
Rubber products
Plastic products
Pottery, china, earthenware
Glass and products
Other non-metallic min. products
Iron and steel
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Machinery except electrical
Machinery electric
Transport equipment
Professional and scientific equipment
Other manufactured products

5
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
3
0
0
6
0
0
1
4
15
0
2
1
0
0
2
1
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Table 3.2. Defendant countries in Brazil's antidumping
investigations
( 1996-1999)
Country

Number
of cases

USA
China
Germany
South Africa
France
India
Mexico
Spain
Romania
United Kingdom
Chile
Japan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Venezuela
Argentina
Australia
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Cuba
Denmark
Hong Kong
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Poland
Thailand
Taiwan
Ukraine
Uruguay

10
9
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics

N

Mean

Standard
deviation Min

Max

443253

3.588

2.788

-14.957

16.008

443253

11.989 2.431

4.615

21.112

443253

0.111

0.193

0

1

log(employment)ft

343252

3.985

1.719

0.693

12.105

Export Share

443253

0.270

0.373

1.76E-07

1

log

)

log (revenue)fdt
ℎ

)

,

Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes firm,
d denotes destination and t denotes time in years.
Sources: SECEX, RAIS and Global Antidumping Database.
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Table 3.4. Estimation Results
(The effect of retaliation threats on the quality of exported products)
Dependent variable: log

ℎ

)

,

)

1

2

3

4

0.113

0.115

0.110

0.118

(0.053)**

(0.053)**

(0.061)**

(0.061)**

0.043

0.042

0.042

(0.002)**

(0.002)**

(0.003)**

0.010

0.009

log (revenue)fdt
log (employment) ft

(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Country-year dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm-product-destination fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.17

0.24

0.28

0.28

Observations

443253

443253

343252

343252

Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes
firm, d denotes destination and t denotes time in years. Standard errors are in the
parentheses (clustered by firm-product combinations). ***, **, * show the level of
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant
term which is suppressed.
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Table 3.5. Who fears more from retaliation?
(The effect of retaliation threats on the quality of exported products)
Dependent variable: log

ℎ

)

ℎ
share

)

,

x

,

)

The role of
export share

The role of richer
countries

The role of heavy
AD users

0.077

0.081

0.078

(0.033)**

(0.042)**

(0.038)**

Export
0.099
(0.054)*

ℎ

)

,

x Rich

0.069
(0.017)***

ℎ

)

,

x Heavy user

0.054
(0.019)*

log (revenue)fdt

0.045

0.120

0.121

(0.003)***

(0.004)***

(0.004)***

0.010

0.009

0.009

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

Country-year dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm-product-destination fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.28

0.26

0.28

Observations

343252

343252

343252

log (employment) ft

Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes
firm, d denotes destination and t denotes time in years. Standard errors are in the
parentheses (clustered by firm-product combinations). ***, **, * show the level of
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant
term which is suppressed.
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